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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
ESSAYS ON EMISSIONS TRADING MARKETS 
by 
Kishore Kumar Dhavala 
Florida International University, 2012 
Miami, Florida 
Professor Mahadev Bhat, Major Professor 
This dissertation is a collection of three economics essays on different aspects of 
carbon emission trading markets.  The first essay analyzes the dynamic optimal emission 
control strategies of two nations.  With a potential to become the largest buyer under the 
Kyoto Protocol, the US is assumed to be a monopsony, whereas with a large number of 
tradable permits on hand Russia is assumed to be a monopoly.  Optimal costs of emission 
control programs are estimated for both the countries under four different market 
scenarios: non-cooperative no trade, US monopsony, Russia monopoly, and cooperative 
trading.  The US monopsony scenario is found to be the most Pareto cost efficient.  The 
Pareto efficient outcome, however, would require the US to make side payments to 
Russia, which will even out the differences in the cost savings from cooperative behavior.  
The second essay analyzes the price dynamics of the Chicago Climate Exchange 
(CCX), a voluntary emissions trading market. By examining the volatility in market 
returns using AR-GARCH and Markov switching models, the study associates the market 
price fluctuations with two different political regimes of the US government. Further, the 
study also identifies a high volatility in the returns few months before the market 
 vii 
 
collapse. Three possible regulatory and market-based forces are identified as probable 
causes of market volatility and its ultimate collapse.  Organizers of other voluntary 
markets in the US and worldwide may closely watch for these regime switching forces in 
order to overcome emission market crashes. 
The third essay compares excess skewness and kurtosis in carbon prices between 
CCX and EU ETS (European Union Emission Trading Scheme) Phase I and II markets, 
by examining the tail behavior when market expectations exceed the threshold level.  
Dynamic extreme value theory is used to find out the mean price exceedence of the 
threshold levels and estimate the risk loss. The calculated  risk measures suggest that 
CCX and EU ETS Phase I are extremely immature markets for a risk investor, whereas 
EU ETS Phase II is a more stable market that could develop as a mature carbon market in 
future years. 
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CHAPTER 1                                                                                      
ECONOMICS OF EMISSIONS TRADING IN THE CONTEXT OF KYOTO 
PROTOCOL FOR GREENHOUSE GAS REDUCTION 
1.1 Introduction 
The international community established the Kyoto Protocol in 1996 for reducing 
the greenhouse gases (GHGs). At the Kyoto global conference, a group of 41 industrial 
and economies-in-transition nations1 and European Union (called Annex I countries) 
agreed to reduce their carbon emission level by  5.2 percent from the 1990 level during 
the Phase I period of 2005-2012 (UNFCCC, 2012)2. During Phase I of the Kyoto 
Protocol, the countries of the Former Soviet Union (FSU) acquired enormous number of 
permits which allowed them to monopolize the emission sellers’ market. Despite being 
one of the largest emitters, the United States (US) did not ratify the protocol during Phase 
I because of political and domestic forces against it.  However, recent developments in 
the US environmental policy have signaled that the country might participate in the 
international emissions trading program (Kropp 2009).  
If the US participates in the emissions trading, it could become the largest buyer. 
If both the FSU and the US participate in the program it will lead to a situation where 
both parties will attempt to exert market power. The US might emerge as a monopsony 
power (single buyer) while Russian Federation as a monopoly power (single seller).  
                                                 
1 Annex I countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, , Czech Republic , Denmark, 
European, Union, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Liechtenstein, 
Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, Netherlands, New, Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia , 
Slovenia Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United  Kingdom, United States of America and Former 
Soviet Union countries (Belarus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Russian Federation , Ukraine). 
 
2 http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/items/2830.php 
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Under the above situation, it is plausible that the buyer as well as the seller may 
have a disagreement over the emission prices. While US as a monopsonist would try to 
demand a price lower than the competitive price, FSU as a monopoly would demand a 
price higher than the competitive price. The purpose of my research is to analyze the 
market outcomes of the interactions between the two diametrically opposite market 
powers (monopsonist versus monopolist), and compare the results with the outcomes of a 
cooperative market interactions. 
Few studies in the literature have examined the Kyoto Protocol under the 
assumption that FSU led by Russia was considered the monopoly seller (Burniaux 1998; 
Bernstein, et al., 1999; Grubb 2003, 2004; Bernard et al., 2003; Chevallier 2007; Bernard 
et al., 2008; Montero 2009). These studies mostly analyzed the supply side of the 
emission market. The market works only when there is enough demand for carbon 
credits. Burniaux (1998) showed that Former Soviet Union (FSU) countries led by 
Russian Federation exploit market power and reduce the supply of tradable permits to 
exploit the market price. Bernstein et al. (1999), investigating Russia’s monopoly power 
within the Annex I countries, reveal that Russia’s monopoly power vanishes if the 
Protocol allows India and China in the trading market. Grubb (2004) analyses Russia’s 
political interest in Kyoto Protocol. Bernard et al. (2008) discuss the monopoly power of 
Russia with and without China in the trading program. Chevallier (2007) and Montero 
(2009), using a leader-follower game structure, investigate how FSU led by Russia could 
act as a leader and exploit the market power.  No studies consider the presence of the US; 
more specifically these studies ignore the buying power of US and/or its desire to be a 
player in the emission market. Arguably, the status of the US as the largest emitter of 
 3 
 
GHGs makes it potentially the largest buyer in the emissions trading market.  If US were 
to sign the Kyoto Protocol today and comply with its 2010 target, it had to lower the 
emission by more than a billion tons of greenhouse gases. Therefore, the US could 
potentially become a monopsonist and exert its market power. The key economic 
question that needs addressed is to what degree the market powers on both sides of the 
permit exchange US and Russia will influence the market efficiency, particularly in terms 
of the abatement costs and their emission paths. The study also addresses the question if 
such a dual market power increases the level of difficulty in reaching a cooperative 
agreement. Further, this study assess a mechanism, which encourage two countries enter 
into a self-enforceable cooperative agreement that minimizes the overall costs of the 
emission control program.  In particular, the study determines an optimal amount of side 
payment that one of the countries might have to pay to the other, in order to ensure a 
Pareto-efficient cooperative agreement.   
The issue of market power in the context of emission trading was first formally 
discussed in the seminal work of Hahn (1984). Hahn analyzed the market power in a 
static framework, where he considered one large polluting firm and a group of small 
polluting firms. He assumed that all polluting firms took output prices as given. Initially, 
emission permits were allocated to firms for free, which needed to use them in the same 
period for which they were issued. That is, firms cannot store permits for future use or 
borrow from future allocations i.e., banking or borrowing option is not possible. Hahn’s 
study shows that market power vanishes when the permit allocation of the large agent is 
exactly equal to its "eﬃcient allocation", i.e., its emissions under perfectly competitive 
pricing.  
 4 
 
Later several studies extended Hahn’s work and analyzed the market power.  In 
particular, Cronshaw and Kruse (1996), Rubin (1996) and Kling and Rubin (1997) 
analyzed the market power of a monopsonist. Unlike Hahn, these studies allowed 
banking and borrowing of the permits and analyzed the optimal behavior of the buyer. 
The main conclusion of these studies is that the monopsonist tries to bargain a lower 
price than the competitive market price so that she can minimize the cost of emission 
control.  The buyer’s market power depends on the nature of the permit market. If seller 
has a relatively flat marginal abatement cost function, i.e., higher the elasticity of 
abatement supply, she will have less market power for the monopsonist and vice versa.  
Liski and Montero (2005a, 2005b) and Chevallier (2007) analyzed the market 
power of a single largest seller or monopolist.  Liski and Montero (2005b) extended the 
static model of Hahn (1984) by introducing the provision for banking of permits and 
examine the effect of market power on permit prices in a dynamic framework. Their 
study reveals that the large agent might manipulate the market by banking allowances 
when it owns all the stock of permits.  Liski and Montero (2005a, 2005b) and Chevallier 
(2007) argue that the large agent will take an advantage of banking permits and create 
demand by selling few credits. The monopoly power of the seller over the permits will 
artificially raise the market demand for the permits. By creating demand for emissions, 
the large firm demands a price higher than the market price and it will retain permits for 
future purpose.  The firm can maximize its revenue and control the supply of the permit 
market by exploiting the market power.  
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However, studies analyzing the simultaneous presence of monopoly and 
monopsony are limited to my knowledge. Muller et al. (2002), Nordhaus and Boyer 
(1999), and Bernstein et al. (1999) only mention the possibility of a leader – leader game 
in a permit trading market but do not actually investigate the effects of market power on 
market outcome. My study extends the existing literature on emission trading with 
unilateral market power by comparing the dynamic models of monopsony and monopoly 
against each other. In particular, the study compares the cost efficiency and emission 
paths under the monopsony-monopoly interactions with those under more common 
market solutions of autarchy (no-trading) and cooperative trading. Using a cost–
minimization dynamic optimal control model, I explore the temporal behavior of the two 
countries in terms of emission abatement, banking and permit trading under different 
market scenarios. The model also allows us to figure out how the relative costs of the two 
countries influence the market powers of the emission trading partners. 
In this chapter, I extend the basic methodologies developed by Rubin (1996) for a 
monopsony buyer, and Liski and Montero (2005a) and Chevallier (2007) for monopoly 
seller. Following Liski and Montero (2005a), I allow banking of the permits. Further, 
comparing Rubin’s (1996) monopsony model and Liski and Montero’s (2005a) 
monopoly model against each other allows us to create a leader-leader scenario and to 
analyze the two market powers simultaneously. Further, I analyze the circumstances 
under which the two parties may fail to reach a permit trading agreement by 
characterizing and comparing their non-cooperative and cooperative price and emission 
paths. The paper also provides the market outcomes especially the net abatement cost 
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savings for the buyer and net permit revenue for the seller if and when there is a mutually 
agreeable trade.  
The leader-leader game assumes a regulator and he has complete information of 
abatement cost functions of both the countries. Initially the regulator allots permits to 
each nation according to the benchmark level3. If the country has more emissions than 
allotted permits, the same can either reduce emissions or buy from the market.  If the 
country has surplus permits, i.e., more allotted permits than the current emission; it will 
have a chance to bank the permits for future purpose or sell the excess permits in the 
market. The seller country has surplus permits, i.e., its emission is less than its allotted 
permits. Seller country can either sell the excess credits in the market or bank them for 
the future purpose. 
Using the above information, I construct different scenarios for the buyer and the 
seller. Scenario 1 is a non-cooperative regime, i.e., when both the countries commit to an 
emission target and reduce the emissions independently. Each country is simply a price 
taker and a non-cooperative, competitive agent in market power. Scenario 2 is when there 
exists a market power of a monopsony buyer.  In the monopsony structure, I consider one 
large buyer (US) who has the market power to decide price or quantity. I assume that 
both the monopsonist and the seller (Russia) have complete information of each other’s 
abatement cost functions. The buyer observes the marginal abatement cost of the seller 
and assumes that this marginal abatement cost is the least possible price he can offer if 
the trade happens. The buyer (US) takes seller’s price as a reaction function and solves 
                                                 
3 Under the Kyoto agreement, each Annex I country acquired permits based on their 1990 level. USA’s 
benchmark is 93% of their 1990 level, Russia 100% of their 1990 level.  
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for a price which maximizes his benefit function. Scenario 3 is when the single seller 
(Russia) exerts its market power. The monopoly setup of the market is similar to the 
monopsony market structure. The seller assumes that the buyer will accept any price 
below her (seller) marginal abatement cost and solves for emission which maximizes her 
(buyer) revenue function4.  Scenario 4 is the cooperative strategy where both players 
cooperate and try to optimize the emission market. They minimize the aggregate 
emission reduction costs and solve for the optimum price and emission path which is 
agreeable to both the seller and the buyer.  
In order to analyze the above scenarios, I develop a strategic leader – leader game 
in a dynamic framework. I use dynamic optimization technique to analyze the optimal 
emission and price paths of the two players, assuming that each tries to optimize the 
respective payoff function.  Further, based on existing studies, I develop estimates of the 
marginal abatement costs for the US and Russia, and numerically solve for the non-
cooperative and cooperative emission paths over time. Later, I calculate the present value 
of total cost of all scenarios for US and Russia. Based on the cost estimates, I develop a 
payoff matrix to identify the Nash-Cournot equilibria for the leader-leader model. I 
observe three possible equilibria, one with no-trade scenario, one with cooperative 
scenario and one with side payments. I observe that equilibrium with side payments is 
Pareto efficient and gives best outcome for both countries.   
                                                 
4 By the time Russia signed the agreement in 2005, its total emission was far less than its 1990 level due to 
economic downturn.  Russia entered the protocol on the condition that it be allowed to increase its emission 
until it reaches certain target.  In the empirical analysis later, therefore, I assume that Russia will follow a 
fixed emission growth path until it reaches a set emission target (for about ten years) and then stays in 
compliance with the Protocol-mandated emission path. 
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The chapter is organized as follows. In section 1.2 presents the motivation and 
relevance for this study and section 1.3 presents the basic set up of the model. In this 
section I discuss the above mentioned four possible scenarios of the emissions market. 
Section 1.4 presents an empirical application of the above scenarios. Section 1.5 provides 
the conclusion. 
1.2 Motivation and background of Kyoto Protocol 
 
For the past fifty years, many countries have experienced a rapid industrialization 
growth. In this process huge amount of carbon dioxide and the greenhouse gases (GHGs) 
were released into the atmosphere. Greenhouse gases mostly come from burning fossil 
fuels, industrial production and some agricultural practices. “Greenhouse gases act like a 
blanket around Earth, trapping energy in the atmosphere and causing it to warm. This 
phenomenon is called the greenhouse effect and is natural and necessary to support life 
on Earth. However, the buildup of greenhouse gases can change Earth's climate and result 
in dangerous effects to human health and welfare and to ecosystems” (Environmental 
Protection Agency, 2012)5. On a per capita basis, Australia, Canada and the US are the 
largest emitters of GHGs of more than 22 tons of CO2eq per person6.  These  high  
emissions  are  partly  explained  by their widespread  use  of  air  conditioning,  high  
meat  consumption,  coal  based  power  industry, transport systems, oil and gas 
extraction, and mining.  
                                                 
5 http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/basics/ 
 
6 United Nations Statistics (2010),  http://unstats.un.org/unsd/environment/air_greenhouse_emissions.htm 
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The total global emissions of GHGs were around 26 GtCO2e in 2005; with a 
population of approximately 6.5 billion people, this amounted to 4 tons of per capita 
carbon emission. The earth’s ecosystem is able to absorb about 11 GtCO2e (3GtC) (IPCC 
2007), i.e., only 1.7 tons of per capita carbon emission. Taking into account of a higher 
expected population growth, if we are to stabilize the global climate, the per capita GHG 
emissions would have to be much lower. The 2007 IPCC report indicates that the main 
sources of global carbon emission are from power generation (26 percent), industry (20 
percent), and deforestation (17 percent). To control for GHG emissions, in 1988 the 
United Nations took an initial step by tasking IPCC, a group of scientists, with 
conducting a climate change study and making appropriate recommendations. 
The IPCC submitted its first report to UN in 1990 and alarmed the world about 
the atmospheric concentrations of the greenhouse gases. Many countries had taken this 
report seriously and agreed to start emission reduction programs. In 1997 under the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change at Kyoto, 41 industrial and 
economies in transition nations (Annex I countries) agreed to reduce their carbon 
emission by 5.2 percent from their 1990 levels.  This agreement, popularly known as the 
Kyoto Protocol, also allowed member countries to trade emission credits among 
themselves in order to meet their targets. This was the first major international agreement 
involving an emission trading scheme.   
After years of negotiation the United States announced that it would not ratify the 
Kyoto Protocol. The effectiveness of the protocol became questionable when the US 
withdrew its support for the agreement. According UNFCCC (1998), the US accounted 
for 36.1 percent and Russian Federation accounted for 17.4 percent of the total emission 
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by Annex I countries. To become legally binding, the Protocol had to ratify at least 55 
percent of total emissions from Annex I countries. When the US withdrew from the 
Kyoto Protocol it made the Russian Federation’s participation essential.  
Kyoto Protocol came into force when Russia ratified the protocol in 2005. The 
Kyoto Protocol set the emission targets for the Phase I (2008-2012). Under the Kyoto 
Protocol, participated countries were allowed to trade the emissions. After the collapse of 
the Soviet Union, many of the polluted industries in Russia were shut down. This de-
industrialization made Russia as one of the largest potential supplier of emission permits 
in the market (Bernard et al., 2008).  Under the Kyoto Protocol Russia and other FSU 
countries can sell their excess emission permits to other Annex I countries.  In literature 
these excess permits sometimes referred as “hot air”7 (Paltsev 2000). Different studies 
have provided different estimates for hot air. Victor et al. (1998) estimated a combined 
total of 344 million tons of carbon (MtC) for the period of 1990-97. This study also 
provided a wide range of market value of hot air; the total value of the permits will be $4 
to 34 billion. Paltsev (2000) study projected little more than the Victor et al. study, this 
study estimated a total of 500 million hot air permits for the period 1990-97.  
As a result of domestic pressure and other political reasons, European Union, 
Japan and Canada opposed the hot air permits allotted to Russia (Bohringer and Loschel, 
2001).  In 2002, the European Union (EU) approved the protocol and the member states 
of EU agreed to ratify. Taking the guidelines of Kyoto Protocol the EU started a 
                                                 
7 Paltsev(2000), “As a result of decline in economic activity, carbon emissions decreased by 34% between 
1990 and 1997. Despite the economic recovery, economies in transition have projected 2010 carbon 
emissions lower than in 1990. These countries can sell their excess emission permits to other Annex B 
parties. The situation in which a party can sell emission permits virtually at no cost to itself is sometimes 
referred to as hot air” 
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mandatory trading program, called European Union’s Emission Trading System (EU 
ETS). The EU ETS was the first international emissions trading system and covers more 
than 10,000 installations in the energy and industrial sectors (Soleille, 2006). EU ETS is a 
very successful, mandatory emission program for the European Union countries.  
The recent developments in the US have rekindled interests in the international 
carbon emission trading. At a more recent UN convention on climate change held in 2009 
in Copenhagen, the US Government rallied other countries to agree to an international 
treaty. President Obama even agreed to cut US emissions by three per cent below 1990 
levels by 2020 (Obama, 2009). However, a broad-based political support for such a cut is 
still lacking in the US. Stone (2011) remarks, “Bargaining remains a substantial obstacle 
to international cooperation.  Every GATT round faced delays and teetered on the edge of 
collapse before it was finally successfully concluded”.  So in this study, we assume that 
an international emission trading agreement along the lines of the Kyoto Protocol will 
come into effect in the near future. 
1.3 Model 
1.3.1 Basic setup of the model  
Let us assume that there are n countries, each with different marginal abatement 
costs. The international regulator wants to bring back the emissions to a safe level.  To do 
so, he sets a global emission cap N. This cap is fixed at any given time but could change 
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over time.  Initially the regulator allots permits to each eligible nation according to the 
benchmark level8.  
Each nation receives a share out of the global emission cap. Let ߙ denote the 
share of emission cap, and 0 ൏ ߙ ൏ 1. The share of country i can be written as	ߙ௜ܰ. We 
assume that the global endowment N is fixed and exogenous to the model. Following 
Montogomery (1972), Hahn (1984) and Rubin (1996), we assume that the abatement cost 
function for country ݅ is ܥ௜ሺ݁௜ሺݐሻሻ, which is continuous, twice differential and convex in 
݁௜  That is, marginal abatement costs  ܥ௜ᇱሺ݁௜ሺݐሻሻ are negative and strictly increasing, i.e., 
ܥ௜ᇱ൫݁௜ሺݐሻ൯ ൏ 0		ܽ݊݀		ܥ௜ᇱᇱ൫݁௜ሺݐሻ൯ ൐ 0. This means that the higher the emission the lower 
the abatement costs.   	
Countries will either buy the permits if their permit quota is less than the actual 
emission or sell/bank if they have excess permits.  Let y be the number of permits either 
bought or sold.  So, y>0 if permits are bought and y<0 if permits are sold. The market 
price of the permit is P. 
Countries may bank permits without any restrictions9. Let ܾ௜ሺݐሻ be the number of 
permits in the bank for country ݅. Whenever ܾ௜ሺݐሻ ൐ 0, it means that the permits are 
banked for future purposes. We assume that permits in the bank are either positive or zero 
at any given time.  Also, there is a small annual cost “	ߝ” ($/permit) for banking the 
permits. 
                                                 
8 In the Kyoto agreement, the benchmark level is 5% below of 1990 emissions level. 
 
9 At international level, under the Kyoto protocol, countries can bank or sell the emission. Borrowing the 
emissions is strictly prohibited. At domestic level, very successful programs like Environmental Protection 
Agency and California Air Resource Board allow banking but not borrowing. 
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Recognizing that certain emission trading programs require depreciation of the 
banked permits, I assume that a small percent of banked permits ߮ depreciate annually.  
Therefore, the net time rate of change in the permits bank is equal to the sum of the 
annual permit allotment and permits bought in the market minus the sum of the number 
permit depreciation and the annual permit consumption (i.e., emissions).  The banking 
and withdrawing constraint can be formally written as: 
ሶܾ ൌ ߙ௜ܰ ൅ ݕ െ ߶ܾ௜ െ ݁௜         (1.1) 
Assume that ܾ௜ሺ0ሻ ൌ 0, i.e., no permits are banked in the initial period. The country i is 
assumed to select the annual emission ie  and iy  that minimize the present value of the 
sum total costs during the planning horizon [0,T].   
1.3.2 Individual country problem without market-power 
In this section, I develop a dynamic optimal control model for an individual non-
cooperative buyer or seller. Both the countries are assumed to operate in a competitive 
market and to be price takers. They are non-cooperative and act independently. No 
market power is assumed.  Each country’s goal is to minimize its own combined total 
abatement costs. The model lays the necessary analytical foundation for the optimal 
emission control models of agents with market power (monopoly and monopsony), to be 
developed in the subsequent sections. The optimality conditions derived from this initial 
model of non-cooperative, competitive emission market will become an integral 
component (i.e., constraints) of the leader-leader game models of market power. 
 
Individual countries try to minimize the following cost function.  
 
 14 
 
dtbeCe i
T
it
rt
ei
])([min
0
ε +−          (1.2) 
Subject to 
)()( tebNtb iiii −−= ϕα                (1.3)
0)(;0)0( ≥= Tbb ii            (1.4) 
Where r is the discount rate, b(t) is the banked permits at time (dot denotes the time 
derivatives). ߙ௜ܰ is the country i’s share in the global cap or in other words we can say 
the initial endowment allotted  by the regulator. The objective function (1.2) reflects that 
each individual country tries to minimize its own abatement cost when there is no trading 
among the countries. Equation (1.4) means there are no permits available at the beginning 
of the program and at the terminal period T, available permits in the bank may be zero or 
some are left over. Now using the banking constraint each country will solve for their 
optimal emission path. 
))()(()]())(([ tetbNtbteCeH iiiii
rtPV
−−++= − ϕαλε     (1.5) 
The corresponding Kuhn-Tucker necessary conditions are: 
ܾ௜:						ߣሶ ൌ െ డுడ௕೔ ൌ െ݁
ି௥௧ߝ ൅ ߣ߮            (1.6) 
ߣ:									 డுడఒ ൌ 		 ሶܾ ൌ ߙ௜ܰ െ ܾ߮௜ െ ݁௜                (1.7) 
݁௜ :							 డுడ௘೔ ൌ ݁
ି௥௧	ܥᇱሺ݁௜ሻ െ ߣ ൒ 0;			݁௜ ൐ 0, ݁௜ డுడ௘೔ ൌ 0	                      (1.8) 
ܾ௜ሺܶሻ ൒ 0,െߣሺܶሻ ൒ 0				ܽ݊݀				ܾ௜	ሺܶሻߣሺܶሻ ൌ 0					        (1.9) 
Equation (1.8), if  డுడ௘೔ ൐ 0, then ݁௜ ൌ 0 and if ݁௜ ൐ 0, then 
డு
డ௘೔ ൌ 0. We assume an interior 
solution for this problem i.e., ݁௜ ൐ 0. Equation (1.8) requires that the present value of 
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marginal abatement cost of country i be equal to the marginal cost of an additional unit of 
banked emissions, i.e., the shadow price of an extra unit of emission banked. Following 
Montogomery (1972) and Rubin (1996), the price of the permit will equal to a unit of 
emission discharged by abatement i.e., െܥ௜ᇱሺ݁௜ሺݐሻሻ ൌ െܥ௝ᇱሺ ௝݁ሺݐሻሻ ൌ ܲሺݐሻ. If there exists a 
permit trading, countries who want to buy the permits will accept any price below their 
marginal abatement cost and countries who sell the permits will accept any price which is 
above their marginal abatement cost. The permit prices are determined by the equilibrium 
conditions of all the countries. Equation (1.9) is the transversality condition, which 
requires that at the terminal period no permits are left in the bank, or even if there are, the 
shadow price of the permits is zero.  
By differentiating equation (1.8) with respect to time, we can solve for the 
following expression involving the time derivative of optimal emission  ሶ݁௜ (dot refers for 
time derivative),  
െݎ݁ି௥௧	ܥᇱሺ݁௜ሻ ൅ ݁ି௥௧	ܥᇱᇱሺ݁௜ሻ ሶ݁௜ െ ߣሶ ൌ 0      (1.10) 
Replacing the ߣሶ ൌ െ݁ି௥௧ߝ  and ݁ି௥௧ܥᇱሺ݁௜ሻ 	ൌ ߣ in the above equation and solving for the 
emission path gives the following expression, 
ሶ݁௜ ൌ ሺݎ ൅ ߮ሻ ஼
ᇲሺ௘೔ሻ
஼ᇲᇲሺ௘೔ሻ െ
ఌ
஼ᇲᇲሺ௘೔ሻ         (1.11) 
Since ܥᇱሺ݁௜ሻ ൏ 0,				ܥᇱᇱሺ݁௜ሻ ൐ 0,	 and ߝ, ݎ, ߮ ൐ 0, one can show that the emission path is 
downward sloping and the optimal emissions decline over the time. Later in section (1.4) 
the above emission paths are numerically solved for Russia and US. The results so 
obtained confirm that the emission paths are indeed downward sloping.  
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1.3.3 Monopsonist’s optimization problem 
 I begin the investigation into optimization problem of a single buyer country with 
market power by assuming there is a national agency that makes buying decision on 
behalf of all the emitters of this country. With the allotment of the permits by the 
international agency, each country tries to minimize its abatement costs. When the 
country’s abatement cost is higher than the market price, it buys the credits from the 
market.  As I assume a single largest buyer, the buyer country agent will have market 
power over the seller country. To make banking constraint binding and more visible in 
the model, I followed Liski and Montero’s (2005a) idea of considering two different 
benchmark levels. I assume that the regulator requires participating country to comply 
with a higher emission target of ߙ௜ܰு for some length of time, say,  ଴ܶ periods.  After the 
଴ܶ  period, the regulator imposes a lower benchmark level of ߙ௜ܰ௅, where  ߙ௜ܰு ≫
ߙ௜ܰ௅. I will show this distinction between higher and lower caps, and some exception in 
the case of Russia more clearly in the empirical section. The buyer’s objective is to 
choose optimal levels of emissions in order to minimize the present value combined costs 
of emission abatement, permits and banking. Formally,  
݉݅݊
݁஻, ௌ݁ ׬ ݁
ି௥௧ሾܥ௧ሺ݁஻ሻ ൅ ௦ܲݕௌ ൅ ߝܾ஻ሿ݀ݐ்଴       (1.12) 
Subject to  
ሶܾ஻ ൌ ߙ஻ܰ ൅ ݕ െ ܾ߮஻ െ ݁஻           (1.13) 
௦ܲ ൌ െܥௌᇱ                  (1.14) 
ݕ ൌ ߙ௦ܰ െ ௌ݁          (1.15) 
ܾሺ0ሻ ൌ 0, 	ܾሺݐሻ ൒ 0          (1.16) 
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where  B is for buyers and  S for sellers. The objective function (1.12) indicates that 
buyer country minimizes the present value costs. The total cost consists of three 
components: abatement cost, the costs of the permits purchased from the market, and the 
storage cost of the banked permits. Since the buyer’s objective is to minimize his cost, 
purchasing permits from the market is most favorable option when his marginal 
abatement cost is higher than the market price. Equation (1.13) is the state equation, 
which implies that the annual change in the permit bank equals the sum of the current 
period shares allotted by the regulator and the number of permits purchased minus the 
sum of the number depreciated permits and the country’s own emission.  Equation (1.14) 
is the constraint that captures the buyer’s market power. Equation (1.14) is the lowest 
possible price the seller can accept, which is equal to the seller country’s marginal 
abatement cost.  The buyer tries to minimize his costs by offering the lowest acceptable 
price.  Equation (1.15) gives the total available permits in the market, i.e., the difference 
between the annual permit share and the current emission level of the seller country. 
Equation (1.16) is the usual non-negativity constraint on banked permits. The present 
value of Hamiltonian and the first order conditions for the above problem can be written 
as: 
ܪ௉௏ 	ൌ 	 ݁ି௥௧ሾܥ஻ሺ݁஻ሻ ൅ ௌܲሺߙ௦ܰ െ ௌ݁ሻ ൅ ߝܾ஻ሿ ൅ ߣሺߙ஻ܰ ൅ ݕ െ ܾ߮஻ െ ݁஻ሻ   (1.17)  
										ൌ 		 ݁ି௥௧ሾܥ஻ሺ݁஻ሻ െ ܥௌᇱሺ ௌ݁ሻሺߙ௦ܰ െ ௌ݁ሻ ൅ ߝܾ஻ሿ ൅ ߣሺߙ஻ܰ ൅ ݕ െ ܾ߮஻ െ ݁஻ሻ 
First order conditions: 
ܾ௜ :				െ ߣሶ ൌ డுడ௕೔ ൌ ݁
ି௥௧ߝ െ ߣ߮              (1.18) 
ߣ:								 డுడఒ ൌ 		 ሶܾ ൌ ߙ஻ܰ ൅ ݕௌ െ ܾ߮஻ െ ݁஻                         (1.19) 
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݁஻ :					 డுడ௘ಳ ൌ ݁
ି௥௧	ܥ஻ᇱ ሺ݁஻ሻ െ ߣ ൌ 0                                                  (1.20) 
ௌ݁ :					 డுడ௘ೄ ൌ െ݁
ି௥௧	ܥௌᇱᇱሺ ௌ݁ሻ ∗ ሺߙ௦ܰ െ ௌ݁ሻ ൅ ݁ି௥௧	ܥௌᇱሺ ௌ݁ሻ െ ߣ ൌ 0     (1.21) 
From equations (3.3.7), (3.3.9) and െܥௌᇱሺ ௌ݁ሻ ൌ ௦ܲ we can derive the following 
expression, 
െ݁ି௥௧	ܥௌᇱᇱሺ ௌ݁ሻ ∗ ሺߙ௦ܰ െ ௌ݁ሻ െ ݁ି௥௧	 ௦ܲ െ ݁ି௥௧	ܥ஻ᇱ ሺ݁஻ሻ ൌ 0          (1.22)  
Rearranging the above equation (1.22) gives, 
ܥ஻ᇱ ሺ݁஻ሻ ൌ ܥௌᇱሺ ௌ݁ሻ െ ܥௌᇱᇱሺ ௌ݁ሻݕ	        (1.23)  
In equation (1.23), when ݕ ൌ 0, i.e., no permits are available in the market, the above 
expression boils down to the condition that the marginal abatement cost of the seller is 
equal to the marginal abatement cost of the buyer and it is exactly the same as the 
optimality condition obtained for the perfectly competitive, non-cooperative market 
situation in the previous section, ܲ ൌ െܥᇱሺ݁௜ሻ ൌ െܥᇱ൫ ௝݁൯.  This result suggests that the 
buyer has the market power only when there are enough permits available in the market. 
Through further simplification of the above equations, we arrive at,  
ܥௌᇱᇱሺ ௌ݁ሻݕ ൅ ௦ܲ ൌ ܯܣܥ஻        (1.24) 
௦ܲ ቀ1 ൅ ஼ೄ
ᇲᇲሺ௘ೄሻ௬
௉ೞ ቁ ൌ ܯܣܥ஻        (1.25) 
௦ܲ ቀ1 ൅ డ஼ೄ
ᇲሺ௘ೄሻ
డ௘ೄ
௬
௉ೞቁ ൌ ௦ܲ ቀ1 ൅
ିௗ஼ೄᇲሺ௘ೄሻ
ௗ௬
௬
௉ೞቁ ൌ ܯܣܥ஻     (1.26) 
Equation (1.26) can be written as, 
௦ܲ ቀ1 ൅ ଵఢೄቁ ൌ ܯܣܥ஻               (1.27) 
Whereas, ߳ௌ ൐ 0		is the supply elasticity of the seller. Equation (1.27) reflects the degree 
of buyer’s market power over the seller.  In the context of permit purchase, the term 
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MACB reflects the buyer’s marginal benefit or marginal avoided abatement cost (realized 
through increased emission and permit buying). If the supply elasticity is large enough, 
i.e., seller has a flat marginal cost function, then the gap between the seller’s price, PS, 
and the buyer’s marginal benefit of permit buying, MACB, becomes narrow. In other 
words, the monopsonist would have less market power over the seller. Note that the two 
sides of equation (1.27) are dependent on the abatement technology. Thus, the degree of 
the market power will ultimately depend on the abatement technology. 
Further, one can derive the emission path of the buyer by differentiating equation (1.20) 
and with respect to time; 
െݎ݁ି௥௧	ܥ஻ᇱ ሺ݁஻ሻ ൅ ݁ି௥௧	ܥ஻ᇱᇱሺ݁஻ሻ ሶ݁஻ െ ߣሶ ൌ 0      (1.28) 
Replace ߣሶ and ߣ with equations (1.18) and (1.21) in the above equation and rearrange the 
terms to obtain the following expression  
ሶ݁஻ ൌ ሺݎ ൅ ߮ሻ ൤஼ೄ
ᇲሺ௘ೄሻି஼ೄᇲᇲሺ௘ೄሻ௬
஼ಳᇲᇲሺ௘ಳሻ
൨ െ ఌ஼ಳᇲᇲሺ௘ಳሻ       (1.29) 
Since ܥ஻ᇱ ሺ݁஻ሻ ൏ 0, ܥ஻ᇱᇱሺ݁஻ሻ ൐ 0; ܥௌᇱሺ ௌ݁ሻ ൏ 0;	ܥௌᇱᇱሺ ௌ݁ሻ ൐ 0; ܽ݊݀	ݕ, ݎ, ߮, ߝ ൐ 0, the above 
expression becomes negative. In other words we can say that emissions path is a 
downward sloping and emissions decline over the time. Equation (1.29) shows that the 
monopsonist will optimize his emissions by observing the marginal abatement cost, 
curvature of the cost function and total available permits of the seller. In addition, the 
rates of discount and permit depreciation and storage costs influence the optimal emission 
path. The monopsonist tries to buy as many as permits, when its marginal abatement cost 
is greater than the seller’s marginal abatement cost.  
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1.3.4 Monopolist’s optimization problem  
In the subsection 1.3.4, I characterize the optimal price and emission path for a 
seller who has complete control over the emission permit market. It is assumed that the 
seller country S is a large seller of permits and is a monopolist. The seller’s goal is to 
maximize his revenue by setting an optimal price or quantity of permits and emission. 
The model structure follows that of Liski and Montero (2005a), which they developed for 
the United States’ sulfur dioxide market. The setup of my model is slightly different form 
theirs10. Unlike their model11 we maximize the present value of revenue from permit sales 
net of total abatement costs, with respect to the current emission, not with respect to the 
abatement like in Liski and Montero.  Additionally, I assume a positive storing cost of 
banked permits. 
Given his current emission levels and cost of the abatement, the seller’s objective 
is to choose the emission levels and permits which maximize his profit; 
݉ܽݔ	 ׬ ݁ି௥௧ሺܲݕ െ ܥௌሺ ௌ݁ሻ െ ߝܾሻ்଴        (1.30) 
subject to                      
ܲ ൌ െܥ஻ᇱ ሺ݁஻ሻ	                 (1.31) 
ݕ ൌ ݁஻ െ ߙ஻ܰ                                    (1.32) 
ሶܾ ௦ ൌ ߙ௦ܰ െ ݁௦ െ ݕ െ ܾ߮௦                    (1.33) 
                                                 
10 Liski and Montero (2005a) analyzed the market power of a monopolist firm. The cost function used in 
their model is a function of quantity reduced by abatement; in this model I use cost as a function of actual 
emissions. The reason for this is the availability of the data. To test our model empirically, we obtained 
UNFCCC’s emissions data, which provided actual emissions of all the participating countries. The other 
difference is “storage cost”; Liski and Montero had assumed a zero storing cost. 
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Equation (1.31) is the maximum acceptable price of the buyer, i.e., marginal abatement 
cost of the buyer, a condition derived from the model of non-cooperative competitive 
model in section 1.3.2. The seller takes this price as a reaction function of the buyer and 
assumes that the buyer accepts this price. Equation (1.32) computes the number of 
permits that seller has available for sale in the market. Equation (1.33) represents the 
usual banking constraint.. 
The present value Hamiltonian for the above problem is: 
ܪ௉௏ ൌ 	 ݁ି௥௧ሾܲሺ݁஻ െ ߙ஻ܰሻ െ ܥௌሺ݁௦ሻ െ ߝܾ௦ሿ ൅ ߣሺߙ௦ܰ ൅ ߙ௦ܰ െ ௌ݁ െ ܾ߮௦ െ ݁௦ሻ	 (1.34) 
		ൌ ݁ି௥௧ሾെܥ஻ᇱ ሺ݁஻ሻሺ݁஻ െ ߙ஻ܰሻ െ ܥௌሺ݁௦ሻ െ ߝܾ௦ሿ ൅ ߣሺߙ௦ܰ ൅ ߙ௦ܰ െ ௌ݁ െ ܾ߮௦ െ ݁஻ሻ 
The first order conditions are given as: 
ܾ௜ :					െ ߣሶ ൌ డுడ௕೔ ൌ െ݁
ି௥௧ߝ െ ߣ߮                                  (1.35) 
ߣ:									 డுడఒ ൌ 		 ሶܾ ൌ ߙ஻ܰ ൅ ߙ௦ܰ െ ௌ݁ െ ܾ߮ௌ െ ݁஻                       `  (1.36) 
݁௦ :							 డுడ௘ೞ ൌ െ݁
ି௥௧	ܥ௦ᇱሺ݁௦ሻ െ ߣ ൌ 0                                             (1.37)       
݁஻ :						 డுడ௘ಳ ൌ െ݁
ି௥௧	ܥ஻ᇱᇱሺ݁஻ሻݕ െ ݁ି௥௧	ܥ஻ᇱ ሺ݁஻ሻ െ ߣ ൌ 0                (1.38) 
From equations (3.4.6) and (3.4.7) we can obtain the following expression  
െ݁ି௥௧	ܥ஻ᇱ ሺ݁஻ሻ ൅ ݁ି௥௧	ܥ௦ᇱሺ݁௦ሻ െ ݁ି௥௧	ܥ஻ᇱᇱሺ݁஻ሻݕ ൌ 0                (1.39)            
െ݁ି௥௧	ܥ௦ᇱሺ݁௦ሻ ൌ െ݁ି௥௧	ܥ஻ᇱ ሺ݁஻ሻ െ ݁ି௥௧	ܥ஻ᇱᇱሺ݁஻ሻݕ     (1.40)   
ܯܴௌ ൌ ஻ܲ ቀ1 െ ஼ಳ
ᇲᇲሺ௘ಳሻ௬
ି஼ಳᇲ ሺ௘ಳሻ
ቁ ൌ ஻ܲሺ1 െ ଵఢ೏ሻ               (1.41) 
where, ߳ௗ ൏ 0	 is the demand elasticity of the buyer. When the buyer has no permits left 
and need to buy the permits from the market to comply with the regulator’s requirement, 
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monopolist take advantage of the situation and let the prices to rise. By doing this, he 
maximizes his revenue function. 
We can derive the emission path of the monopolist by differentiating equation 
(1.37) with respect to time and replacing ߣሶ and ߣ with (1.35) and (1.38), which will give 
the following expression:  
ሶ݁ௌ ൌ ݎ ஼ೄ
ᇲሺ௘ೄሻ
஼ೄᇲᇲሺ௘ೄሻ
൅ ߮ ൤஼ಳᇲ ሺ௘ಳሻା஼ಳᇲᇲሺ௘ಳሻ௬஼ೄᇲᇲሺ௘ೄሻ ൨ െ
ఌ
஼ೄᇲᇲሺ௘ೄሻ      (1.42) 
As mentioned in earlier section that ܥ஻ᇱ ሺ݁஻ሻ ൏ 0,	ܥௌᇱሺ ௌ݁ሻ ൏ 0; ܥ஻ᇱᇱሺ݁஻ሻ ൐ 0; 	ܥௌᇱᇱሺ ௌ݁ሻ ൐ 0;	 
ܥ஻ᇱ ሺ݁஻ሻ ൏ 0, ܥ஻ᇱᇱሺ݁஻ሻ ൐ 0; 	ܽ݊݀	ݕ,ݎ, ߮, ߝ ൐ 0 the above expression becomes negative. 
Equation (1.42) tells that monopolist optimal emission path depends on the permits 
demanded by the buyer. When buyer agent demanded more permits, the monopolist emits 
fewer emissions and sells the permits to the fringe agent. I ignored the above optimal path 
and assumed a linear growth for Russia in the empirical section. Theoretically, a 
monopolist would follow the above emission path but recent developments in the 
Russia’s emission reduction programs suggest that Russia do not follow the emission 
path for next 10 years12.  
Monopsony response to monopoly: 
In this sub-section, I characterize the monopsonist’s (US) optimal response when 
the monopolist (Russia) exerts its market power by charging a price that is equal to US’s 
own marginal abatement cost, as in equation (1.31). This solution is particularly 
necessary for the empirical analysis later, in order to estimate the total (combined) costs 
                                                 
12 In recent Rio+20 summit, Russia’s former president and current chairman of the Govt. of the Russian 
Federation , Dimitry Medvedev announced that Russia is committed to reduce their emissions to 25 percent 
below 1990 levels by 2020. However,  Russian emissions have already reached to 34 percent below 1990 
level. This means, to meet 75 percent of 1990 level in 2020, they can able to increase their current emission 
level by 9 percent between 2010 and 2020 (Executive, The Russian government documentation, 2012).  
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of the emission abatement program for the Russia-Monopoly scenario. Formally, in 
response to Russia’s monopoly price, the monopsonist attempts to solve the following 
problem: Based on this information the monopsonist solve for his optimum emission 
path.  
݉݅݊
݁஻ ׬ ݁
ି௥௧ሾܥ௧ሺ݁஻ሻ ൅ ஻ܲݕௌ ൅ ߝܾ஻ሿ݀ݐ்଴       (1.43) 
subject to     
ሶܾ஻ ൌ ߙ஻ܰ ൅ ݕ െ ܾ߮஻ െ ݁஻           (1.44) 
஻ܲ ൌ െܥ஻ᇱ                   (1.45) 
ݕ ൌ ߙ௦ܰ െ ௌ݁          (1.46) 
ܾሺ0ሻ ൌ 0, 	ܾሺݐሻ ൒ 0          (1.47) 
 ܪ௉௏ 	ൌ 	 ݁ି௥௧ሾܥ஻ሺ݁஻ሻ ൅ ஻ܲݕ ൅ ߝܾ஻ሿ ൅ ߣሺߙ஻ܰ ൅ ݕ െ ܾ߮஻ െ ݁஻ሻ   (1.48)  
										ൌ 		 ݁ି௥௧ሾܥ஻ሺ݁஻ሻ െ ܥ஻ᇱ ሺ݁஻ሻݕ ൅ ߝܾ஻ሿ ൅ ߣሺߙ஻ܰ ൅ ݕ െ ܾ߮஻ െ ݁஻ሻ 
 
First order conditions: 
ܾ௜ :				െ ߣሶ ൌ డுడ௕೔ ൌ ݁
ି௥௧ߝ െ ߣ߮              (1.49) 
ߣ:								 డுడఒ ൌ 		 ሶܾ ൌ ߙ஻ܰ ൅ ݕௌ െ ܾ߮஻ െ ݁஻                         (1.50) 
݁஻ :					 డுడ௘ಳ ൌ ݁
ି௥௧	ܥ஻ᇱ ሺ݁஻ሻ െ ݁ି௥௧	ܥ஻ᇱᇱሺ݁஻ሻݕ െ ߣ ൌ 0                                  (1.51) 
To obtain the emission path, differentiate equation (1.51) with respect to time and re-
arrange the terms so that 
 ሶ݁஻ ൌ ሺݎ ൅ ߮ሻሺ ஼ಳ
ᇲ ሺ௘ಳሻି஼ಳᇲᇲሺ௘ಳሻ௬
஼ಳᇲᇲሺ௘ಳሻି஼ಳᇲᇲᇲሺ௘ಳሻ௬
ሻ െ ఌ஼ಳᇲᇲሺ௘ಳሻି஼ಳᇲᇲᇲሺ௘ಳሻ௬     (1.52) 
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Equation (1.52) indicates that the buyer’s optimum emission path will be different from 
the emission paths we derived for its no-trade scenario (equation 1.11) and monopsony 
scenario (equation 1.29).  The buyer accepts a price that equals his marginal abatement 
cost and buys the permits from the seller. By doing so, the buyer reduces emission at a 
slower than he would under the no-trade scenario.     
1.3.5 Cooperative aggregate reduction model 
The subsection 1.3.5 presents a cooperative trading program, built on the 
assumption that the agreement is binding on buyer and seller countries and is enforced by 
an international agency. Here, I am presenting two scenarios. Scenario (i) has that both 
buyer and seller follow optimal emission paths and solve for joint/aggregate optimal 
emission path. Scenario (ii) applies when only buyer follows the optimal emission path 
and seller follows a fixed emission path. The reason to formulate scenario (ii) is because 
of the current Russian climate policy. In a recent meeting at 2012 Rio Earth summit, 
Russia’s Chairman of the Government, Dmitry Medvedev said, “...we need to develop 
sustainable production and consumption, which will ensure sustainable economic growth 
and to remove all threats - critical threat - to the environment…Russia is an 
environmental donor, which has considerable natural resources…  We are successfully 
coping with the performance of its obligations, including the Kyoto Protocol. I would like 
to reiterate that by 2020, greenhouse gas emissions in Russia will be 25% below 1990 
levels. We look forward to equally active measures on the part of other states. We are 
ready to be part of a global agreement on this issue, but it is global, which will be open to 
all, not the individual's major economies.” One may infer from this statement that Russia 
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is committed to maintaining emissions so that their 2020 level does not exceed 25% of its 
1990 level. Russia’s current emission level is much lower than its 2020 expected level.  
Therefore, in scenario (ii), we assume that Russia will follow a linear emission growth 
path to reach their 2020 target; thereafter they will stay at 2020 target. On the basis of 
Russia’s emission pattern information, US will try to optimize their emission path. 
Scenario (i): Following Rubin (1996) and Liski and Montero (2005), both countries solve 
for a joint optimization problem. Their goal is to minimize the total aggregate cost and 
jointly maintain the global emission level. 
݉݅݊ ׬ ݁ି௥௧்଴ ሾ∑ܥሺ݁௜ሻሿ        (1.53) 
subject to                    
ܤሶ ൌ ܰ െ ߮ܤ െ ܧ                             (1.54) 
ܤሺ0ሻ ൌ 0	ܽ݊݀	ܤሺݐሻ ൒ 0                    (1.55) 
Where, N, E represents global cap and aggregate emissions respectively. As in the 
previous cases, N is set at a higher level for the first T0 years and then a lower level 
thereafter.  Equation (1.54) represents the aggregate banking constraint. Equation (1.55) 
is non-negativity constrain on permits banked. The present value of the Hamiltonian is: 
 ܪ௉௏ ൌ 	 ݁ି௥௧ሾ∑ܥሺ݁௜ሻሿ ൅ ߣሺܰ െ ߮ܤ െ ܧሻ       (1.56) 
The first order necessary conditions for optimality are:  
ܤሶ ൌ డுడఒ೔ ൌ ܰ െ ߮ܤ െ ܧ                              (1.57) 
ߣሶ ൌ െ డுడ஻ ൌ െ߮                                        (1.58) 
݁ି௥௧ܥᇱሺ݁௜ሻ െ ߣ ൌ 0                                     (1.59) 
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Equation (1.59) requires that negative of the marginal abatement cost െܥ௜ᇱሺ݁௜ሻ ൌ
െܥ௝ᇱ൫ ௝݁൯ ൌ ܲሺݐሻ for ݅ ് ݆, where ܲሺݐሻ is calculated based on the equimarginal principle. 
Which we can take as equilibrium price of the market or aggregate marginal abatement 
cost. The emission path of this problem can be obtained by differentiating (1.59). 
െݎ݁ି௥௧ܥᇱሺ݁ሻ ൅ ݁ି௥௧ܥᇱᇱሺ݁ሻ ሶ݁ െ ߮ߣ ൌ 0      (1.60) 
ሶ݁ ൌ ሺ௥ାఝሻ஼ᇲሺ௘ሻ஼ᇲᇲሺ௘ሻ           (1.61) 
Since ܥᇱሺ݁௜ሻ ൏ 0;				ܥᇱᇱሺ݁௜ሻ ൐ 0; 		ߝ, ݎ, ߮ ൐ 0 , based on this information, we can say that 
the emission path is downward sloping and emissions decline over the time.  
Scenario (ii): 
݉݅݊
݁஻ ׬ ݁
ି௥௧ሾܥ௧ሺ݁஻ሻ ൅ ܲݕௌ ൅ ߝܾሿ݀ݐ்଴        (1.62) 
subject to     
ሶܾ஻ ൌ ߙ஻ܰ ൅ ݕ െ ܾ߮ െ ݁஻            (1.63) 
ܲ ൌ െܥ௔ᇱ ሺܧሻ                  (1.64) 
ݕ ൌ ߙ௦ܰ െ ௌ݁          (1.65) 
ܧ ൌ ݁஻ ൅ ௌ݁          (1.66) 
ܾሺ0ሻ ൌ 0, 	ܾሺݐሻ ൒ 0          (1.67) 
Equations (1.62) and (1.64) together require that the buyer minimizes his cost by paying a 
price that equals to the aggregate marginal abatement cost. The buyer (US) assumes that 
seller (Russia) follows a fixed emission path. To maintain a joint global emission level, 
the buyer optimizes his emission path by observing the joint aggregate emissions. 
Equation (1.65) gives the permits available in the market. Equation (1.66) represents an 
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aggregate emission. The corresponding present value of Hamiltonian of the above 
scenario will be, 
ܪ௉௏ 	ൌ 	 ݁ି௥௧ሾܥ஻ሺ݁஻ሻ ൅ ܲݕ ൅ ߝܾ஻ሿ ൅ ߣሺߙ஻ܰ ൅ ݕ െ ܾ߮ െ ݁஻ሻ   (1.68)  
										ൌ 		 ݁ି௥௧ሾܥ஻ሺ݁஻ሻ െ ܥ௔ᇱ ሺܧሻݕ ൅ ߝܾ஻ሿ ൅ ߣሺߙ஻ܰ ൅ ݕ െ ܾ߮஻ െ ݁஻ሻ 
First order conditions: 
ܾ௜ :				െ ߣሶ ൌ డுడ௕೔ ൌ ݁
ି௥௧ߝ െ ߣ߮              (1.69) 
ߣ:								 డுడఒ ൌ 		 ሶܾ ൌ ߙ஻ܰ ൅ ݕௌ െ ܾ߮஻ െ ݁஻                         (1.70) 
݁஻ :					 డுడ௘ಳ ൌ ݁
ି௥௧	ሾܥ஻ᇱ ሺ݁஻ሻ െ ܥ௔ᇱᇱሺܧሻݕሿ െ ߣ ൌ 0                                      (1.71) 
The emission path of the problem can be obtained by differentiating (1.71) and replace ߣሶ 
and ߣ with equations (1.69) and (1.71) will give the following expression;  
ሶ݁஻ ൌ ଵ஼ಳᇲᇲሺ௘ಳሻି஼ᇲೌᇲᇲሺாሻ௬ ሾሺݎ ൅ ߮ሻሺܥ஻
ᇱ ሺ݁஻ሻ െ ܥ௔ᇱᇱሺܧሻݕሻ ൅ ܥ௔ᇱᇱᇱሺܧሻݕ ሶ݁ௌ െ ߝሿ  (1.72) 
Using the equimarginal principle and the optimality condition, the buyer equates his 
marginal abatement cost with the aggregate marginal cost function.  
 
Now equation (1.72) becomes as, 
ሶ݁஻ ൌ ଵ஼ಳᇲᇲሺ௘ಳሻି஼ᇲೌᇲᇲሺாሻ௬ ሾሺݎ ൅ ߮ሻሺܥ௔
ᇱ ሺܧሻ െ ܥ௔ᇱᇱሺܧሻݕሻ ൅ ܥ௔ᇱᇱᇱሺܧሻݕ ሶ݁ௌ െ ߝሿ (1.73) 
Equation (1.73) shows that the buyer’s optimal emission path depends on not only his 
own marginal abatement cost, but also aggregate marginal emission costs. Same as in 
other scenarios, the emission path of the buyer is downward sloping.  
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1.3.6 Comparative analysis of all three models 
Figure 1.1 presents buyer’s optimal emission paths under the three different 
scenarios.  On the basis of theoretical models, I expect that the buyer’s no-trade emission 
path will be the steepest than those under the monopsony and cooperative situations.  The 
US will maintain its emission below the initial allowance level ߙ஻ܰு, and thus, will bank 
the permits.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       Figure 1.1. Buyer’s emission reduction paths under different scenarios 
At t = T0 the allowance level is reduced to a lower level ߙ஻ܰ௅ and the US will 
start drawing down its stored permits for a few more years. The lower level target allows 
the US to maintain its optimal emissions at levels higher than the annual allowance until 
eB = ߙ஻ܰ௅  at t = TN* .Under the monopsony, the US will buy all the permits from the 
seller as long as the buyer’s marginal abatement cost is higher than the seller’s marginal 
abatement cost (MAC). In the initial periods, the US consumes more of its permits than it 
did under the cooperative scenario, although it banks much of the purchased permits for 
future use.   Therefore, the monopsony optimal emission path is higher than the no-
Monopsony 
time 
Cooperative No-trade 
଴ܶ 
ܰܤܪ 
ܰܤܮ  
ேܶ∗  ஼ܶ∗ ெܶ∗  
emissions 
 29 
 
trading emission path.  For the same reason it is able to hold the emission path above its 
allowance for a much longer period, i.e., Tn*  < Tm*.   In cooperative scenario, the buyer 
pays a price equivalent to the aggregate marginal costs and buys the permits from the 
seller.  I expect the emission reduction path under the cooperative scenario to be steeper 
than that of the monopsony and gentler than the no-trade situation. For the reason, Tn*  < 
Tc* < Tm*.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
         Figure 1.2. Seller’s emission reduction paths under different scenarios 
Figure (1.2) shows the emission reduction path of the seller under three different 
scenarios. I assume that seller’s current emission level, i.e., ܰܵ஼ is much lower than the 
baseline level, ்ܰܵ. The seller can sell the accumulated permits in the international 
market. Region “A” shows accumulated permits. Seller has no incentive to save the 
permits if there is no market for him. Seller will wait for T0 periods then decide what to 
do with saved permits. In a no-trade scenario, seller consumes all his permits after T0 
periods. Once the permits get exhaust he will stay at baseline level. If seller acts as a 
monopoly, he expects a price equals the marginal abatement cost of the buyer, in order to 
maximize his revenue function, the seller sells all the accumulated permits and tries to 
்ܰܵ 
T=10 
time 
B
A 
ܰܵ஼ 
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abate further until his MAC equals to the price offered by the buyer. In the cooperative 
scenario, the seller sells the permits and stays at the baseline level once the permits 
exhaust. 
1.4 Empirical application 
1.4.1 Data and model parameters 
According to the Kyoto Protocol, Annex I countries accounts for 55 percent of 
1990 emissions, out of which US contributes 36.1 percent and the Russian Federation 
accounts for 17.4 percent (Bernard et al. 2008). With the absence of US, the Russian 
Federation has become the largest permit seller in the market and exploited the market by 
increasing the bargaining power and forced to a higher permit price (Manne and Richels, 
2001). So in this section we have calibrated different scenarios for Russia, which I 
assumed as a largest seller (monopolist) and United States, which is the largest buyer 
(monopsonist). 
I tried to estimate the MACs of the two countries, by assuming that both countries 
are aware of each other’s total abatement cost functions, and solve for their optimal 
emission paths, particularly for the US. This assumption will allow us to estimate the 
dynamic interaction of the two countries.  
There are four scenarios in the empirical model, which are as follows: (i) the 
autarkic or no-trading situation: Countries bind to the Kyoto agreement and agree to 
reduce their emission levels independently, i.e., non- cooperatively bind to the Kyoto 
agreement. 
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(ii) US as a monopsonist: US as the single largest buyer exerts its market power.  Under 
this situation, the US attempts to minimize its cost function by offering Russia the lower 
possible price.  That is, it observes the marginal abatement cost function of Russia. The 
buyer assumes that the MAC of the seller is the minimum acceptable price. The buyer 
takes the seller’s MAC as a reaction function and solves for optimum emission reduction 
path. 
(iii) Russia as a monopolist: Russia as the single largest seller exerts its market power.  
Its objective is to maximize the present value net revenue by fetching the highest market 
price for its permits. Russia observes US’s MAC function, and assumes that the latter 
accepts any price below or equal to its MAC.  
(iv) Cooperative trading: Both countries will achieve Nash-Cournot equilibrium when 
they cooperate and solve for a joint cost function.  Russia is allowed to follow a fixed-
growth emission path for the first ten years and then to stay at its annual allowance level.  
Russia and US both agree to the annual price that is equal to the aggregate marginal 
abatement costs.  US optimizes its emission path so that െܥ௜ᇱሺ݁௜ሻ ൌ െܥ௝ᇱ൫ ௝݁൯ ൌ ܲሺݐሻ.   
 Table 1.1 provides the parameters used in the empirical simulation. Liski and 
Montero (2011) and Jacoby et al. (1999) assumed a 5 percent discount rate.  I think this is 
a little high number for an environmental policy which has a long time horizon. I apply 
two percent discount rate (i.e., the US current lending interest rate). For a lack of better 
information, the storage cost of the permits is assumed to be $1 per permit.  Further, I 
consider a one percent annual depreciation rate for the banked permits. The latest year 
that emission information is available for is 2009. The starting year of the model 
simulation is 2010. For the US, the long-term Kyoto Protocol emission target is 93 
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percent (ߙ஻ܰ௅ = 5,730 million metric tons) of its 1990 level (6,161 million metric tons).   
For Russia, the long-term emission target is set at 75 percent (ߙௌܰ௅ = 2,527 million 
metric tons) of the 1990 level (3,369 million metric tons). The above emission levels are 
obtained from the UNFCCC and represent total CO2 equivalent emissions from land use, 
land-use changes and forest degradation.     
In addition, Russia has been claiming permits for its having maintained its 
emission much below the Kyoto target in the recent years.  Russia had ratified the Kyoto 
Protocol in 2005 on the conditions that signatory countries give credit to its excess 
emission reductions in the form of tradable permits, which are popularly known as ‘hot 
air’ credits. Different studies have estimated the Russia’s hot air credit to be in the range 
of one to one and one-half billion tons (Euractiv, 2009)13. For this study, therefore, I 
assume that Russia gets to trade an additional 1.2 billion permits during the first six years 
of the simulation. This assumption would be more reasonable than applying all the 
permits for just one or two years.  
Table 1.1. Parameters used for calibration of the models 
 ݎ ൌ ݎܽݐ݁ 
݋݂	݅݊ݐ݁ݎ݁ݏݐ 
Storage cost 
of permits 
Depreciation Initial emission 
(2010 level) 
(mmt) 
Target level 
(mmt)  
USA 0.02 $1 0.01 6608 6608 
Russia 0.02 $1 0.01 2208  2527 
1For US, the emission allowance is set at 93 percent of its 1990 emission level and for Russia, the 
allowance is set at 75 percent of its 1990 level. mmt- million metric tons 
 
I choose the marginal abatement cost curve used by Ellerman and Decauz (1998), 
and the data points from  Morris et al. (2008). As reported in Ellerman and Decauz 
                                                 
13 http://www.euractiv.com/climate-change/russian-hot-air-threatens-un-cli-news-222798 
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(1998), the abatement cost function is a cubic function i.e., marginal abatement cost 
function (MAC) is twice continuously differentiable.  
Morris et al. (1998) estimated the marginal abatement costs for US at different 
levels of abatement.  I calculated the quantity of emissions (eB) for each abatement 
quantity.   
Although Morris et al. (1998) has MAC and eS data, recent literature on 
abatement cost studies indicate that the costs have come down.  I use recent estimates 
reported in the Russian socio-ecological union and climate secretary.14  The Russia’s 
metallurgical industry has the most expensive technology; it costs $72 per ton of carbon 
dioxide. Emission control in the energy sector (e.g., waste bark, wood coal and petroleum 
gas-fired units) costs $4 per ton of carbon dioxide.  The study also reports that the current 
average unit cost of reducing greenhouse gas emissions and the cost to meet the 2020 
target level would be around $12 per ton and $8 per ton.  Table 1.2 presents the marginal 
abatement costs associated with different emission levels for the US and Russia. Using 
these data points, I estimate equation (4.1.1) using ordinary least squares regression 
method. 
െܯܣܥሺ݁ሻ ൌ ܽ ൅ ܾ݁ ൅ ܿ݁ଶ       (1.74) 
 
  
                                                 
14 http://www.rusecounion.ru/kioto_7612 
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Table 1.2. MACs and emission data used for the cost function estimation 
US Russia 
 
MAC 
($/ton) 
 
eB 
(million 
metric ton) 
MAC 
($/ton) 
eS 
(million 
metric ton) 
-103.07 3679 -80 0 
-80.15 4414 -72 100 
-64.2 5150 -12 2120 
-45.08 5886 -8 2524 
-17.13 6622 -4 3600 
-6.16 6989 -- -- 
-0.73 7284 -- -- 
0 7357 -- -- 
         Source: Moriss et al. (2008); Russian socio-ecological union15 (2012)  
The aggregate MAC is calculated algebraically from the MACs of US and Russia, 
using the equimarginal cost principle. First, I calculate emissions associated with 
different MAC points for US, and then I used the same set of MAC points to calculate 
emissions for Russia. Since MAC is quadratic function, I take only positive roots and 
calculated combined emission. Then, I estimate the regression equation to obtain the 
coefficients of the aggregate marginal abatement cost. Table 1.3 provides the estimated 
coefficients for the US and Russia.  Since these estimates are based on limited data, the 
results must be used with caution.   
 The model is simulated for 20 years under each scenario, using the Excel 
program.  The simulation generates optimal paths of emission, permit traded, stock of 
stored permits, and prices.  Finally, the present value sum of the costs of abatement and 
the costs of permit trading and banking are computed.         
                                                 
15 http://rusecounion.ru/ang_kioto_7612 
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       Table 1.3. Coefficients of marginal abatement cost curve approximations  
 a b c 
USA -188.306 0.0209 0.000000683 
Russia -80 0.0473 -0.00000073 
Aggregate -177.96 0.0248 -0.00000007 
         Note: All coefficients are statistically significant at 5 percent level 
 
1.4.2 Emiprical simulation results  
Table 1.4 provides emission levels and prices at five year interval for all 
scenarios. The computed values of emissions and prices of all years and scenarios are 
reported in the Appendix 1.  
Table 1.4. Emission reductions and prices of all three scenarios 
year 
No Trade  
US 
Monopsony 
US
Cooperative 
US
No Trade
 Russia
Monopoly  
Russia 
Cooperative 
Russia
e P e P e P e P E P e P
 
2010 
 
6608 
 
21 
 
6608 
 
11
 
6608
 
15
 
2208
 
11
 
2208 
 
21 
 
2208
 
15
 
2015 6172 33 6359 9 6340 16 2367 9 2367 33 2367 16 
 
2020 5730 46 5902 7 6004 18 2527 7 2527 46 2527 18 
 
2025 5730 46 5730 6 5730 22 2686 6 2527 46 2527 22 
 
2030 5730 46 5730 4 5730 22 2846 4 2527 46 2527 22 
(e = emission in million metric tons; P = price in $/ton) 
Table 1.5 presents the pay-off matrix of all scenarios. The total gains from the 
cooperative scenario are calculated as the difference of no-trade and cooperative 
outcomes. 
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Table 1.5. Present value costs of emission abatement, permit trading and permit banking 
of model scenarios ($ million) 
Scenarios US Russia Total Cost 
 
No-trading 480,224 76,578 556,802 
 
US Monopsony 431,257 40,747 472,004 
 
Russia Monopoly 526,804 -4,864 521,940 
 
Cooperative trading 448,557 25,988 474,545 
Gain from cooperative trading 31,667 50,590 82,257 
 
Scenario (i) Non-cooperative emission abatement without permit trading: 
The two model countries meet the Kyoto commitment by following their 
respective optimal emissions paths and/or staying below the sum of their annual 
allotment and the permits withdrawn from the bank. In this process each country 
minimizes present value total costs.  Figures 1.3, 1.4, 1.5 and 1.6  presents the optimal 
emission paths, and the stock of banked permits for the US and Russia under the non-
cooperative scenario. The detailed calibration results are presented in the Appendix 1.  
The optimal emission path of the US is in full compliance with the two annual 
benchmark levels—a higher benchmark level of 6,608 million metric tons for the first 5 
years and a lower benchmark level of 5,730 million metric tons thereafter.  There will be 
a slow reduction in the emissions for the first five years.  At the end of 2015, the US will 
have banked 552 million permits, and the corresponding emission level will be 6,172 
million metric tons. The new benchmark level, 5730 million metric tons (mmts), will start 
in year 2016. To reach 5,730 mmts emission level, US starts consuming the banked 
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permits until the year 2016 and thereafter it will stay at the 5,730 mmts. The computed 
present value total cost of the program for the US would be $480.23 billion.  
 
                    Figure 1.3. Permits banked and consumed by US in a no-trade scenario 
 
 
                  Figure 1.4 US’s emissions’ path when there is no-trade   
                      Note: Initial benchmark starts in 2010, second benchmark level starts in 2015. US will  use                   
                     the banked permits and reach second benchmark in 2016, thereafter it will stay at that level 
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                    Figure 1.5.  Permits banked and consumed by Russia in a  no-trade scenario 
 
 
                       Figure 1.6.  Emissions’ path for Russia when there is no-trade 
                           Note: Russia’s benchmark level starts in 2020, their 2020 emission level is higher    
                           than 2010 level, so saved permits will used after 2020, and use them until permits exhaust.  
 
Scenario (ii) US with monopsony power 
See figures 1.7 and 1.8 for optimal emission, banking and prices paths of the US.  
As we have seen in the section 1.3.3, as a largest buyer US will try to exert the market 
power and tries to bargain for a lower price. As buyer, US’s objective is to minimize the 
total cost, which includes the cost of permits it buys from Russia. The US observes the 
marginal abatement cost of Russia and offers a price equal to the marginal abatement cost 
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of Russia. By doing this, US try to buy all the available permits and optimizes its own 
emission path. The emission reduction in this scenario will be slower than that of the no-
trade situation. The US has more permits at its disposal than that in the case of no-trade 
situation, and therefore, uses some of it towards emission reduction obligation.  Also, the 
US will bank more permits for future purpose. When the second benchmark level starts, 
US will start withdrawing permits from the bank and finally exhausts year 2020, which is 
five years later compared to the no-trade scenario.    
 
                         
Figure 1.7. Emissions’ reduction path when US act as a monopsony 
                             Note: Initial benchmark starts in 2010, second benchmark level starts in 2015. US buys  
                             all the permits from Russia and save them for future. US will start use the banked  
                             permits after the year  2016 and consume until they exhaust. 
 
Initially US offers a price of $11 per permit, which is the MAC of Russia. If 
Russia accepts the price offered by the US, the latter buys all 2,634 million permits from 
the former. The present value total cost in this setup would be $431.28 billion, which 
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represents a cost saving of $49 billion to the US over the no-trade situation. This is the 
most beneficial option for US. 
     
 
                   Figure 1.8. US Monopsony price and banked permits 
        Note: Upper panel shows the monopsony price and lower panel represents the  
        banked permits. Second benchmark starts in year 2016  
 
On the other hand, if Russia accepts the price equal to its own marginal cost, it 
will sell all the permits. In doing so, Russia incurs a cost of $40.8 billon.  This cost is $35 
billion less than the cost of the no-trading scenario.  However, as we will see in the next 
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section, this scenario is not the best option for Russia, who therefore may not accept the 
offer.  
Scenario (iii) Russia with monopoly power: 
In the literature several studies (Paltsev 2000; Bernard et. al., 2003; Bohringer 
and Loschel, 2001) have estimated the monopoly power of Russia in the absence of the 
US.  All these studies argue that as monopoly Russia has less market power due to excess 
supply of permits and less demand. But Russia’s situation might change if US enters into 
the market. As a monopoly Russia expects a higher price to maximize the revenue 
function. As mentioned earlier, I assume that the seller (Russia) is aware of the abatement 
cost function of the buyer (US). The seller’s objective is to maximize its revenue by 
bargaining a higher price. The seller assumes that the buyer will pay any price lower than 
its (buyer) marginal abatement cost. So, seller takes marginal abatement cost of buyer as 
constraint and optimizes the monopoly price. If the US has no bargaining power, it will 
accept the monopoly price. I assume that Russia still considers their 2020 target and will 
sell all the saved permits. Russia’s permits will exhaust in year 2020 and thereafter it 
maintains the 2020 target level. In doing so, Russia will earn a revenue of $4.8 billion. 
This is the most beneficial option for the Russia. But, by accepting the monopoly price, 
US incurs a cost of $526.8 billion, which is $46.58 billion higher than its no-trading cost 
and $95.55 billion more than the monopsony scenario. So, instead of buying permits from 
monopoly, US prefers to abate emission on its own without engaging in permit trade.    
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              Figure 1.9. Russia emissions’ path when there is cooperation 
               Note: Russia will follow linear growth path until it reaches 2020 target leve. 
 
 
 
                        Figure 1.10. Russia as a monopoly, price and permits sold in the market 
                             Note: Russia sell all the permits it has, no permits will be banked., Upper panel shows  
                             the monopoly price and lower panel shows the permits sold.  
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Scenario (iv) Cooperative trading and joint cost minimization: 
In this scenario, both countries cooperate and commit to reducing the aggregate 
emission level. Here I assume that, only the US follows the optimum emission path 
whereas Russia follows its usual fixed growth emission path, i.e., reaching the level that 
is 25 percent below 1990 level in 2020. I assume that the US is aware of Russia’s 2020 
target and optimizes its emission path by buying the credits from Russia and offering a 
price equal to the aggregate marginal abatement cost.. The calculated marginal abatement 
cost or initial offer price will be $14.84; this price is higher than Russia’s no-trade price 
or US monopsony’s price. If Russia accepts this price, the US will buy all available 
permits from Russia. Now the US optimizes the emission path using the equation (1.73).  
In this scenario also I assume two benchmark levels explained in the above sections. US 
will start using the accumulated permits in the year 2016 and consumes until the permits 
exhaust in year 2021. The emission reduction path in this scenario is less steeper than that 
of no-trade situation (see figure 1.11). The US reaches its 1990 level benchmark in year 
2021. As seen earlier, even with monopsony power US reaches its 1990 level in year 
2020, but the problem is Russia will not accept the monopsony price and US ends up 
with no-trade situation. The total cost of abatement and trading for the US would be 
$448.56 billion, which is $ 31 billion less than the cost associated with the no-trade 
situation. For Russia, accepting the cooperative price will be beneficial compared to its 
no-trading situation. With the cooperative price, Russia incurs a total cost of $25.98 
billion, which is $50 billion less than their no-trade scenario. The combined cost savings 
for the US and Russia from the cooperative trading would be $82.25 billion.  
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Figure 1.11. US emission reductions pattern of all three scenarios 
Note: Higher benchmark level starts in 2010, lower benchmark level starts in 2015, US’s target is to reach 
lower benchmark at a slower rate. 
 
 
 
 
  Figure 1.12. Russia emissions reductions patter of all three scenarios  
   Note: Russia benchmark level starts in 2020, i.e., 2527 mmts. Under no trade scenario, Russia consume       
all the saved permits after 2020. 
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1.4.3 Efficiency comparison of alternative permit trading scenarios 
This sub-section analyzes all possible scenarios for the US and Russia. Table 1.6 
pins down the pay-offs associated with various trading scenarios. If both countries agree 
to participate in the Kyoto Protocol in a cooperative way, the two parties will realize the 
best outcome. Reaching a cooperative agreement may not occur if either party attempts to 
exert its market power and demands a different price. The outcomes of the various 
scenarios analyzed suggest that there will be two Nash equilibria; one is the no-trade 
strategy, which is a default situation and the other is the cooperative strategy. Neither the 
Russia’s monopoly nor US’s monopsony power will be effective by itself on each other. 
The costs associated with the no-trade scenario are higher than the costs associated with 
the cooperative scenario. Table 1.6 provides the normalized pay-off in relation to the 
US’s cost under the non-trade scenario.  
       Table 1.6. Costs associated with sequentially rational behavior by Russia and US 
 
Initially the game is considered as a 4 ൈ 4 matrix. No matter what the strategy of 
other player is, if either of them is not interested in permit trading, the result will be a no-
trade outcome. Now the game is reduced to a 3 ൈ 3 matrix.  At this stage, if Russia can 
    Russia
US 
  No-Trade Monopoly Monopsony Cooperative
No-Trade 1.00, 0.16 1.00, 0.16 1.00, 0.16 1.00, 0.16 
Monopoly 1.00, 0.16 1.16, -0.01 1.00, 0.16 1.00, 0.16 
Monopsony 1.00, 0.16 0.90, -0.01 0.90, 0.08 1.00, 0.16 
Cooperative 1.00, 0.16 1.00, 0.16 1.00, 0.16 0.93, 0.05 
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play as a monopoly, it will gain a revenue of 0.01 points compared to the US’s no-trade 
cost level.  In other words, from table 1.5 we can say that Russia will gain a revenue of 
$4 billion (i.e., the lowest cost of all scenarios). If the US accepts the monopoly price, it 
will incur a higher cost ($527 billion) than it would in the case of no-trade scenario ($480 
billion). So US will not accept the monopoly price and prefers not to participate in the 
trading program. Now the game is reduced to a 2ൈ 2 matrix.  Let us assume that the US 
can act as a monopsony and Russia accepts the US’s price, which is the lowest price of 
all scenarios. Russia’s cost will be 0.03 units more than that of cooperative trading, so 
Russia prefers cooperative price than monopsony price; on the contrary, the US will incur 
more cost in cooperative scenarion than its monospsony scenario. If US insists the 
monopsony price, Russia probably will not prefer monopsony price knowing that 
exerting its (Russia’s) own market power would have fetched a much higher benefit. So 
at this stage Russia either prefer cooperative outcome or no-trade outcome. US observes 
the Russia’s reaction and prefers cooperative outcome, which will be more cost-effective 
than its non-cooperative scenario. At this stage they agree to cooperate and jointly reduce 
their emissions. From cooperation, the US will gain $32 billion while Russia will $51 
billion (table 1.5). 
1.4.4 Mechanisms for reaching cooperation 
Several studies have examined the transboundary pollution policies in the 
literature.  In the absence of an external agency, the question is how to enforce a binding 
emission control agreement between two countries,  In a seminal work on “Acid Rain 
Game”, Maler and Zeeuw (1989) suggested a transfer payment method to achieve a full 
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cooperation among the polluting countries. This study examined the strategies of Great 
Britain and other neighboring countries in dealing with the depositions of sulpher and 
nitrogen oxides loads. They examined the cooperative and non-cooperative outcomes 
related to the critical or benchmark levels. The compliance of critical emission level 
would result in a higher cost. To achieve lower pollution levels and cost reductions, their 
study showed that a full cooperation would be a favorable option vis-a-vis a  non-
cooperative outcome. In order to achieve a full cooperation, implementing a side payment 
scheme that would transfer the benefits from nations having higher net benefits to nations 
having lower net benefits.  In this way each nation will be better off and there is a Pareto 
improvement.   
As we observed in the earlier section, the game scenario developed in table 1.5 
resembles the Maeler and Zeeuw’s work. Table 1.5 illustrates two equilibria: a no-trade 
equilibrium and a cooperative equilibrium. In addition, I provide evidence of another 
equilibrium with side payments, which happens to be best outcome for both the countries.  
Since it is a two country problem, to achieve cooperative outcome, both countries have to 
agree for a joint reduction scenario as discussed in section 1.3.5.  The US can lower the 
cost by $31 billion from cooperative trading, whereas for Russia will lower the cost by 
$51 billion.  Thus, the combined cost savings would be $82 billion. However, if the two 
countries follow the US monopsony scenario, they together achieve a cost saving of $85 
billion ($49 billion by the US and $36 billion by Russia), which is the highest cost 
savings of all scenarios. Thus from group efficiency point of you,  monopsony scenario is 
the best scenario.  That is, it meets the group rationality criterion. However, under this 
scenario, Russia does not meet its own individual rationality criterion in that its cost 
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saving from cooperative monopsony is only $36 billion whereas the US’s cost savings 
would be $49 billion from the monopsony behavior.  
One way to ensure a self-enforcing cooperation (Russia having to agree to the US 
Monopsony situation) is to institute a side payment plan which would require the US to 
pay Russia so that the differences in the cost savings of the two countries are split at an 
agreed fraction. Under this scenario, following an egalitarion criterion, the US would 
have to pay a present value sum of $6,568 million to Russia such that both countries will 
end up enjoying a present value cost saving of $42,399 million over the life of the 
emission/trading program.   
As indicated earlier, the literature suggests different ways to institute side 
payments.  One option is an ex ante lump sum payment (Munro, 1979). Another option is 
to pay an annual fixed installment. The annual fixed installment program has an 
advantage in that if either party reneges in the middle of the game, the other country will 
adapt its trigger strategy by defaulting to its non-cooperative, no-trade scenario. The third 
option, is to pay the total cost saving differences in variable annual installments. Bhat and 
Huffaker (2006) show that the variable annual installment method meets both group and 
individual rationality criteria, in order to ensure a game that is renegotiation proof. The 
annual payment can be simply viewed as a fixed price premium over and above the 
Russia’s annual MAC. For the above program, the estimated additional price premium is 
$2.675 per permit, which amounts to a present value lump sum payment of $6,568 
million. Note that this is the side payment necessary to make Russia adhere to the US’s 
monopsony behavior. 
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1.5 Conclusion 
This chapter characterized the dynamic optimal emission control strategies of two 
nations when one of the nations had the ability to act as a monopoly and the other as a 
monopsony. In particular, under the Kyoto Protocol for greenhouse emissions, the US has 
the potential to become the largest buyer of permits. On the other hand, Russia has 
maintained its emission below it Kyoto Protocol target, and thus, has acquired a large 
number of tradable carbon permits. Therefore, Russia was assumed to be the largest seller 
of emission permits. In this study, the market interaction between the two nations has 
been modeled as a leader-leader game.   
I have discussed four possible emission reduction scenarios: no-cooperative no-
trading, US as a monopsonist, Russia as a monopolist, and cooperative agreement for 
trading. In each scenario, I have examined the optimal emissions in response to the 
available permits. The buyer will purchase the permits when the permit price is lower 
than his marginal abatement cost. Banking of the permits is allowed in the model, i.e., the 
saved permits can be banked for future use or sold in the market.  I considered two levels 
of emission targets for the buyer.  Initially, the buyer complies with the higher emission 
target for some time, ଴ܶ periods. After ଴ܶ periods, the second benchmark or lower 
emission cap will be introduced. When the lower emission cap is imposed, the buyer can 
either consume permits saved in the bank , purchase from the market, reduce his 
emission, or adapt some combination of all three options. Buyer’s emission reductions 
will be faster in non-cooperative scenario than the monopsony or cooperative scenario. 
Since Russia is below its allowed target, in consistent with the Kyoto agreement, in the 
model I allowed this country to increase its emission until it reached its target.   
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As mentioned earlier, in the empirical section, I considered US as a monopsony 
and Russia as monopoly. For each scenario, I simulated the optimal emission path, stock 
of banked permits, permit trades, price paths, and the present value cost of emission 
control program. Looking at the present value costs of all scenarios, I observed two Nash 
equilibria. First, a non-cooperative equilibrium occurs if any one of them is either not 
interested in trading, or bargaining for high/low permit price. Second, the cooperative 
equilibrium occurs if both countries agree to reduce the emission costs jointly and agree 
to follow a price path that is equal to their aggregate marginal abatement costs.  
The US incurs a cost of $480 billion when there is no trade, $431 billion in the 
monopsony scenario and $448 billion in cooperative trading scenario. Thus, US’s best 
option would be acting as a monopsonist and bargaining for the lowest price on permit 
purchase. On the other hand, Russia incurs a cost of $76 billion and $26 billion under 
non-cooperative and cooperative scenarios, respectively. But it will have a benefit of $4 
billion if it acts as a monopoly and bargains for a higher price. On the basis of these 
scenarios, I have observed that both countries will experience cost savings through 
cooperation.   
Interestingly, I found that the scenario in which the US acted as a monopsonist 
resulted in the most Pareto efficient outcome, in terms of the combined present value 
costs of emission control. The practical question that arose then was how to enforce an 
agreement that resulted in Pareto efficient outcome. I introduced the side payment 
scheme into the game. In this scenario, without any side payment, the US offered a price 
equal to the marginal abatement cost of Russia each year, and purchased all the available 
permits. By buying the permits, US lowered the emission reduction costs by $49 billion 
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from its no-trade scenario, and reached the lower emission cap in the year 2021. Whereas 
for Russia, the cost savings under the monopsony scenario was only $36 billion. 
Therefore, Russia would prefer either no-trade or cooperative trading to the US 
monopsony scenario. In order to institute a self-enforced, Pareto efficient binding 
agreement (i.e., the monopsony scenario), I proposed a transfer payment to Russia. The 
payment has to be sufficient enough to even out the differences in the cost saving 
advantage between the two countries (i.e., $49 billion for the US vs $36 billion for 
Russia). That is, the US would have to pay a present value sum of $6,568 million to 
Russia.   
Following the past literature on transfer payments, there are three different 
options. One option is to pay an ex ante lump sum payment (i.e., in the beginning of the 
agreement). Obviously, with this option, the US would run the risk of losing the benefit 
of this payment if Russia changes its mind later in the game and resorts to no-trade 
scenario. The second and more self-enforcing agreement would be to pay a fixed annual 
sum throughout the life of the cooperative agreement. I also proposed a third and the 
most robust agreement. Such a payment program involves a variable annual payment that 
consists of paying a fixed price premium on every permit purchased throughout the life of 
the agreement. The variable annual payment program allows parties to monitor each 
other’s emission control and payment compliance behavior in the past and continue to 
comply with the agreement year after year if they are satisfied with the ongoing 
agreement. 
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APPENDIX 1 
 
Table 1.7. The calibrated model for US No-Trade scenario   
 
Year Emission MAC d(MAC) d
2(MAC) e-dot b-dot B 
2010 6608 -20.54 0.03 1.37E-06    0.00
2011 6547 -22.36 0.03 1.37E-06 -60.92 60.92 60.92
2012 6484 -24.25 0.03 1.37E-06 -63.53 123.23 184.15
2013 6417 -26.22 0.03 1.37E-06 -66.26 187.02 371.17
2014 6348 -28.26 0.03 1.37E-06 -69.12 252.40 623.56
2015 6128 -34.73 0.03 1.37E-06 -72.10 -623.56 0.00
2016 5730 -46.27 0.03 1.37E-06 -81.70 0.00 0.00
2017 5730 -46.27 0.03 1.37E-06 0.00 0.00 0.00
2018 5730 -46.27 0.03 1.37E-06 0.00 0.00 0.00
2019 5730 -46.27 0.03 1.37E-06 0.00 0.00 0.00
2020 5730 -46.27 0.03 1.37E-06 0.00 0.00 0.00
2021 5730 -46.27 0.03 1.37E-06 0.00 0.00 0.00
2022 5730 -46.27 0.03 1.37E-06 0.00 0.00 0.00
2023 5730 -46.27 0.03 1.37E-06 0.00 0.00 0.00
2024 5730 -46.27 0.03 1.37E-06 0.00 0.00 0.00
2025 5730 -46.27 0.03 1.37E-06 0.00 0.00 0.00
2026 5730 -46.27 0.03 1.37E-06 0.00 0.00 0.00
2027 5730 -46.27 0.03 1.37E-06 0.00 0.00 0.00
2028 5730 -46.27 0.03 1.37E-06 0.00 0.00 0.00
2029 5730 -46.27 0.03 1.37E-06 0.00 0.00 0.00
2030 5730 -46.27 0.03 1.37E-06 0.00 0.00 0.00
Note: We assume that US adopt the Kyoto benchmark level after years of the agreement. In mean time US reduce the permit gradually 
and bank the saved   permits for future use. MAC-marginal abatement cost, d(MAC)-first derivative of the MAC,   d2(MAC)-second 
derivative of the MAC; e-dot- time derivative  of the emissions, b-dot-time derivative of the banked permits ;  b – permits banked, 
emissions are in million tons.  
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Table 1.8. The calibrated model for Russia No-Trade scenario 
 
Year Emission MAC d(MAC) d
2(MAC) e-dot b-dot b 
2010 2208 -11.07 0.02 -1.5E-05 0
2011 2240 -10.60 0.01 -1.5E-05 -81.16 318.75 318.75
2012 2272 -10.14 0.01 -1.5E-05 -83.11 286.88 605.63
2013 2304 -9.70 0.01 -1.5E-05 -85.20 255.00 860.63
2014 2336 -9.27 0.01 -1.5E-05 -87.47 223.13 1083.75
2015 2367 -8.86 0.01 -1.5E-05 -89.92 191.25 1275.00
2016 2399 -8.46 0.01 -1.5E-05 -92.57 159.38 1434.38
2017 2431 -8.08 0.01 -1.5E-05 -95.45 127.50 1561.88
2018 2463 -7.71 0.01 -1.5E-05 -98.58 95.63 1657.50
2019 2495 -7.36 0.01 -1.5E-05 -101.99 63.75 1721.25
2020 2527 -7.02 0.01 -1.5E-05 -105.73 31.88 1753.13
2021 2559 -6.69 0.01 -1.5E-05 -109.83 0.00 1753.13
2022 2591 -6.39 0.01 -1.5E-05 -114.35 -31.88 1721.25
2023 2622 -6.09 0.01 -1.5E-05 -119.34 -63.75 1657.50
2024 2654 -5.81 0.01 -1.5E-05 -124.89 -95.63 1561.88
2025 2686 -5.55 0.01 -1.5E-05 -131.08 -127.50 1434.38
2026 2718 -5.30 0.01 -1.5E-05 -138.03 -159.38 1275.00
2027 2750 -5.07 0.01 -1.5E-05 -145.87 -191.25 1083.75
2028 2782 -4.85 0.01 -1.5E-05 -154.78 -223.13 860.63
2029 2814 -4.64 0.01 -1.5E-05 -164.99 -255.00 605.63
2030 2846 -4.45 0.01 -1.5E-05 -176.78 -286.88 318.75
Note: We assume that Russia follow linear growth path in emission, in notrade scenario,  after year 2020, Russia will use the  
 saved   permits in the later years. MAC-marginal abatement cost, d(MAC)-first derivative of the MAC,   d2(MAC)-second derivative 
of the MAC; e-dot- time derivative  of the emissions, b-dot-time derivative of the banked permits ;  b – permits banked, emissions are 
in million tons.  
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Table 1.9. Calibrated model for US as a monopsony   
Year Emission 
MAC 
US 
d(MAC)
US
MAC
Russia
d(MAC)
Russia
d2(MAC)
Russia
e-dot
monopsony
Permits
Purchased b-dot b
2010 6608 -21 0.03 -11.07 0.02 -1.46439E-05 0
2011 6556 -22 0.03 -10.60 0.01 -1.46439E-05 -51.90 486.88 538.78 538.78
2012 6505 -24 0.03 -10.14 0.01 -1.46439E-05 -50.85 455.00 552.37 1091.15
2013 6455 -25 0.03 -9.70 0.01 -1.46439E-05 -49.84 423.13 564.81 1655.96
2014 6407 -27 0.03 -9.27 0.01 -1.46439E-05 -48.87 391.25 576.16 2232.12
2015 6359 -28 0.03 -8.86 0.01 -1.46439E-05 -47.94 359.38 -291.80 1940.32
2016 6312 -29 0.03 -8.46 0.01 -1.46439E-05 -47.04 327.50 -273.72 1666.60
2017 6268 -31 0.03 -8.08 0.01 -1.46439E-05 -43.70 95.63 -459.16 1207.44
2018 6225 -32 0.03 -7.71 0.01 -1.46439E-05 -42.97 63.75 -443.47 763.97
2019 6183 -33 0.03 -7.36 0.01 -1.46439E-05 -42.28 31.88 -428.63 335.34
2020 5902 -41 0.03 -7.02 0.01 -1.46439E-05 -41.63 0.00 -335.34 0.00
2021 5730 -46 0.03 -7.02 0.01 -1.46439E-05 -171.97 0.00 0.00 0.00
2022 5730 -46 0.03 -7.02 0.01 -1.46439E-05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
2023 5730 -46 0.03 -7.02 0.01 -1.46439E-05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
2024 5730 -46 0.03 -7.02 0.01 -1.46439E-05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
2025 5730 -46 0.03 -7.02 0.01 -1.46439E-05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
2026 5730 -46 0.03 -7.02 0.01 -1.46439E-05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
2027 5730 -46 0.03 -7.02 0.01 -1.46439E-05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
2028 5730 -46 0.03 -7.02 0.01 -1.46439E-05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
2029 5730 -46 0.03 -7.02 0.01 -1.46439E-05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
2030 5730 -46 0.03 -7.02 0.02 -1.46439E-05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
   Note: MAC-marginal abatement cost, d(MAC)-first derivative of the MAC,  d2(MAC)-second derivative of the MAC; e-dot- time derivative  of the emissions,  
   b-dot-time derivative of the banked permits ; b – permits banked, emissions are in million tons. 
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Table 1.10. Calibrated model for US when both agree to reduce emissions jointly   
Year 
Aggregate 
Emission Emission MAC
d(MAC)
US
MAC
Aggregate
d(MAC)
Aggregate
d2(MAC)
Aggregate
edot
for US
Permits
purchased b-dot b
2010 8816 6608 -20.54 0.03 -14.58 0.01 -1.42581E-06 0.00
2011 8794 6554 -22.14 0.03 -14.85 0.01 -1.42581E-06 -53.55 486.88 540.42 540.42
2012 8773 6501 -23.74 0.03 -15.11 0.01 -1.42581E-06 -53.60 455.00 556.75 1097.17
2013 8751 6447 -25.33 0.03 -15.38 0.01 -1.42581E-06 -53.65 423.13 572.96 1670.13
2014 8729 6393 -26.92 0.03 -15.65 0.01 -1.42581E-06 -53.70 391.25 589.06 2259.18
2015 8707 6340 -28.51 0.03 -15.92 0.01 -1.42581E-06 -53.76 359.38 -273.22 1985.96
2016 8685 6286 -30.10 0.03 -16.19 0.01 -1.42581E-06 -53.81 327.50 -248.56 1737.40
2017 8666 6234 -31.62 0.03 -16.44 0.01 -1.42581E-06 -51.55 95.63 -426.40 1311.01
2018 8646 6183 -33.13 0.03 -16.68 0.01 -1.42581E-06 -51.55 63.75 -402.45 908.55
2019 8626 6131 -34.64 0.03 -16.93 0.01 -1.42581E-06 -51.55 31.88 -378.75 529.80
2020 8530 6004 -38.36 0.03 -18.13 0.01 -1.42581E-06 -51.55 0.00 -529.80 0.00
2021 8257 5730 -46.27 0.03 -21.65 0.01 -1.42581E-06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
2022 8257 5730 -46.27 0.03 -21.65 0.01 -1.42581E-06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
2023 8257 5730 -46.27 0.03 -21.65 0.01 -1.42581E-06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
2024 8257 5730 -46.27 0.03 -21.65 0.01 -1.42581E-06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
2025 8257 5730 -46.27 0.03 -21.65 0.01 -1.42581E-06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
2026 8257 5730 -46.27 0.03 -21.65 0.01 -1.42581E-06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
2027 8257 5730 -46.27 0.03 -21.65 0.01 -1.42581E-06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
2028 8257 5730 -46.27 0.03 -21.65 0.01 -1.42581E-06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
2029 8257 5730 -46.27 0.03 -21.65 0.01 -1.42581E-06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
2030 8257 5730 -46.27 0.03 -21.65 0.01 -1.42581E-06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Note: MAC-marginal abatement cost, d(MAC)-first derivative of the MAC,  d2(MAC)-second derivative of the MAC; e-dot- time derivative  of the emissions, b-dot-time derivative of the 
banked permits ; b – permits banked, emissions are in million tons.   
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                          Table 1.11. US in response to Russia’s monopoly price 
Year Emission
MAC-
US
d(MAC)
US
d2(MAC)
US
e-dot 
monopoly 
Permits
purchased b-dot b
2010 6608 -20.54 0.03 1.37E-06 0
2011 6538 -22.64 0.03 1.37E-06 -70.22 486.88 557.09 557.09
2012 6466 -24.76 0.03 1.37E-06 -71.47 455.00 591.12 1148.21
2013 6394 -26.92 0.03 1.37E-06 -72.78 423.13 626.11 1774.32
2014 6319 -29.11 0.03 1.37E-06 -74.13 391.25 662.10 2436.42
2015 6244 -31.34 0.03 1.37E-06 -75.52 359.38 -179.14 2257.28
2016 6167 -33.60 0.03 1.37E-06 -76.98 327.50 -132.25 2125.02
2017 6095 -35.69 0.03 1.37E-06 -71.72 95.63 -291.09 1833.94
2018 6022 -37.82 0.03 1.37E-06 -73.04 63.75 -247.00 1586.93
2019 5948 -39.99 0.03 1.37E-06 -74.42 31.88 -201.99 1384.95
2020 5872 -42.18 0.03 1.37E-06 -75.85 0.00 -156.00 1228.95
2021 5793 -44.44 0.03 1.37E-06 -78.40 0.00 -76.04 1152.91
2022 5712 -46.77 0.03 1.37E-06 -81.05 0.00 5.77 1158.67
2023 5629 -49.17 0.03 1.37E-06 -83.79 0.00 89.50 1248.18
2024 5542 -51.64 0.03 1.37E-06 -86.65 0.00 175.26 1423.44
2025 5745 -45.84 0.03 1.37E-06 -89.62 0.00 -29.50 1393.93
2026 5745 -45.84 0.03 1.37E-06 -82.69 0.00 -29.21 1364.72
2027 5745 -45.84 0.03 1.37E-06 -82.69 0.00 -28.92 1335.80
2028 5745 -45.84 0.03 1.37E-06 -82.69 0.00 -28.63 1307.18
2029 5745 -45.84 0.03 1.37E-06 -82.69 0.00 -28.34 1278.83
2030 5745 -45.84 0.03 1.37E-06 -82.69 0.00 -28.34 1250.78
                              Note: MAC-marginal abatement cost, d(MAC)-first derivative of the MAC,  d2(MAC)-second derivative of the MAC; e-dot- time derivative  of the 
                              emissions, b-dot-time derivative of the banked permits ; b – permits banked, emission are in million tons 
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         Table 1.12. Calibrated model for Russia as a Monopoly 
Year Emission 
MAC 
Russia
d(MAC)
Russia
MAC
US
d(MAC)
US
d2(MAC)
US
e-dot
monopoly bdot b
2010 2208 -11.07 0.02 -20.54 0.03 1.37E-06 0
2011 2240 -10.60 0.01 -22.15 0.03 1.37E-06 -81.16 318.75 518.75
2012 2272 -10.14 0.01 -23.82 0.03 1.37E-06 -83.11 286.88 1005.63
2013 2304 -9.70 0.01 -25.53 0.03 1.37E-06 -85.20 255.00 1460.63
2014 2336 -9.27 0.01 -27.29 0.03 1.37E-06 -87.47 223.13 1883.75
2015 2367 -8.86 0.01 -33.46 0.03 1.37E-06 -89.92 191.25 2275.00
2016 2399 -8.46 0.01 -33.60 0.03 1.37E-06 -92.57 159.38 2434.38
2017 2431 -8.08 0.01 -35.69 0.03 1.37E-06 -95.45 127.50 2561.88
2018 2463 -7.71 0.01 -37.82 0.03 1.37E-06 -98.58 95.63 2657.50
2019 2495 -7.36 0.01 -39.99 0.03 1.37E-06 -101.99 63.75 2721.25
2020 2527 -7.02 0.01 -42.18 0.03 1.37E-06 -105.73 31.88 2753.13
2021 2527 -6.69 0.01 -44.44 0.03 1.37E-06 -109.83 0.00 2753.13
2022 2527 -6.39 0.01 -46.27 0.03 1.37E-06 -114.35 0.00 2753.13
2023 2527 -6.09 0.01 -46.27 0.03 1.37E-06 -119.34 0.00 2753.13
2024 2527 -5.81 0.01 -46.27 0.03 1.37E-06 -124.89 0.00 2753.13
2025 2527 -5.55 0.01 -46.27 0.03 1.37E-06 -131.08 0.00 2753.13
2026 2527 -5.30 0.01 -46.27 0.03 1.37E-06 -138.03 0.00 2753.13
2027 2527 -5.07 0.01 -46.27 0.03 1.37E-06 -145.87 0.00 2753.13
2028 2527 -4.85 0.01 -46.27 0.03 1.37E-06 -154.78 0.00 2753.13
2029 2527 -4.64 0.01 -46.27 0.03 1.37E-06 -164.99 0.00 2753.13
2030 2527 -4.45 0.01 -46.27 0.03 1.37E-06 -176.78 0.00 2753.13
                Note: MAC-marginal abatement cost, d(MAC)-first derivative of the MAC,  d2(MAC)-second derivative of the MAC; e-dot- time derivative  of the  emissions, b-dot-time derivative  
             of the banked permits ; b – permits banked, emission are in million tons. 
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                Table 1.13. US’s abatement and total cost under No-Trade Scenario 
             
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                       
 
 
                      Note: emissions are in million tons, permits in dollars, cost in million dollars 
  
 
 
Year 
 
Emission
Banked 
permits 
Abatement 
Cost 
Total 
Cost 
Present 
Value 
2010 6608 0 0 480,224 
2011 6554 54 8136 8029
2012 6498 163 9419 9210
2013 6441 329 10840 10525
2014 6381 553 12412 11978
2015 6172 0 18776 17006
2016 5730 0 36387 32311
2017 5730 0 36387 31677
2018 5730 0 36387 31056
2019 5730 0 36387 30447
2020 5730 0 36387 29850
2021 5730 0 36387 29265
2022 5730 0 36387 28691
2023 5730 0 36387 28129
2024 5730 0 36387 27577
2025 5730 0 36387 27036
2026 5730 0 36387 26506
2027 5730 0 36387 25987
2028 5730 0 36387 25477
2029 5730 0 36387 24977
2030 5730 0 36387 24488
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Table 1.14. US’s abatement and total cost under monopsony scenario 
   
 
Year 
emissions Abatement Cost 
price of 
permit 
permits 
purchased 
banked 
permits 
Total 
Cost PV 
2010 6608 0 11.07 0 0 431,257
2011 6556 8088 10.60 487 539 13517 
2012 6505 9250 10.14 455 1091 14375 
2013 6455 10464 9.70 423 1656 15288 
2014 6407 11725 9.27 391 2232 16246 
2015 6359 13031 8.86 359 1940 16444 
2016 6312 14379 8.46 328 1667 16709 
2017 6268 15690 8.08 96 1207 15383 
2018 6225 17033 7.71 64 764 15609 
2019 6183 18408 7.36 32 335 15880 
2020 5902 28857 7.02 0 0 23672 
2021 5730 36387 6.69 0 0 29265 
2022 5730 36387 6.39 0 0 28691 
2023 5730 36387 6.09 0 0 28129 
2024 5730 36387 5.81 0 0 27577 
2025 5730 36387 5.55 0 0 27036 
2026 5730 36387 5.30 0 0 26506 
2027 5730 36387 5.07 0 0 25987 
2028 5730 36387 4.85 0 0 25477 
2029 5730 36387 4.64 0 0 24977 
2030 5730 36387 4.45 0 0 24488 
   Note: emissions are in million tons, permits in dollars, cost in million dollars 
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Table 1.15. US’s abatement and total cost under the cooperative scenario 
 
 
Year 
Emissions Abatement Cost 
Price of 
permit 
Permits 
purchased 
Banked 
permits 
Total 
Cost PV 
2010 6608 14.57 0 0 0 448,557
2011 6554 8125 14.85 487 540 15582 
2012 6501 9354 15.11 455 1097 16655 
2013 6447 10671 15.38 423 1670 17762 
2014 6393 12074 15.65 391 2259 18898 
2015 6340 13564 15.92 359 1986 19266 
2016 6286 15141 16.19 328 1737 19697 
2017 6234 16731 16.44 96 1311 17076 
2018 6183 18400 16.68 64 909 17388 
2019 6131 20147 16.93 32 530 17753 
2020 6004 24803 18.13 0 0 20347 
2021 5730 36387 21.65 0 0 29265 
2022 5730 36387 21.65 0 0 28691 
2023 5730 36387 21.65 0 0 28129 
2024 5730 36387 21.65 0 0 27577 
2025 5730 36387 21.65 0 0 27036 
2026 5730 36387 21.65 0 0 26506 
2027 5730 36387 21.65 0 0 25987 
2028 5730 36387 21.65 0 0 25477 
2029 5730 36387 21.65 0 0 24977 
2030 5730 36387 21.65 0 0 24488 
Note: emissions are in million tons, permits in dollars, cost in million dollars 
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Table 1.16. US’s abatement and total cost in response to  Russia’s monopoly price 
 
 
Year 
Emission Abatement Cost 
Permit 
Price 
Permits 
purchased 
Banked 
permits 
Total 
Cost 
Present 
Value 
2010 6608 0 526,805
2011 6538 8498 22.64 487 0 19136 
2012 6466 10192 24.76 455 557 21161 
2013 6394 12073 26.92 423 1148 23192 
2014 6319 14149 29.11 391 1774 25234 
2015 6244 16432 31.34 359 2436 27290 
2016 6167 18931 33.60 328 2257 28585 
2017 6095 21416 35.69 96 2125 23465 
2018 6022 24101 37.82 64 1834 24193 
2019 5948 26997 39.99 32 1587 24984 
2020 5872 30113 42.18 0 1385 25839 
2021 5793 33508 44.44 0 1229 27938 
2022 5712 37205 46.77 0 1153 30245 
2023 5629 41224 49.17 0 1159 32763 
2024 5542 45592 51.64 0 1248 35499 
2025 5745 35697 45.84 0 1423 27581 
2026 5745 35697 45.84 0 1394 27018 
2027 5745 35697 45.84 0 1365 26468 
2028 5745 35697 45.84 0 1336 25929 
2029 5745 35697 45.84 0 1307 25401 
2030 5745 35697 45.84 0 1279 24883 
   Note: emissions are in million tons, permits in dollars, cost in million dollars 
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                   Table 1.17. Russia’s abatement and total cost under no-trade scenario 
Year Emissions Abatement Cost
Banked 
Permits
Total 
Cost
Present 
Value 
2010 2208 0 0.00 0 76,578 
2011 2240 5749 318.75 5948
2012 2272 5418 605.63 5790
2013 2304 5102 860.63 5619
2014 2336 4800 1083.75 5435
2015 2367 4511 1275.00 5240
2016 2399 4235 1434.38 5034
2017 2431 3971 1561.88 4817
2018 2463 3720 1657.50 4589
2019 2495 3480 1721.25 4352
2020 2527 3250 1753.13 4105
2021 2559 3032 1753.13 3848
2022 2591 2823 1721.25 3583
2023 2622 2625 1657.50 3310
2024 2654 2435 1561.88 3029
2025 2686 2254 1434.38 2740
2026 2718 2081 1275.00 2445
2027 2750 1916 1083.75 2142
2028 2782 1758 860.63 1833
2029 2814 1607 605.63 1519
2030 2846 1462 318.75 1198
                       Note: emissions are in million tons, permits in dollars, cost in million dollars,  
                       I excluded hot air from no trade scenario.  
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   Table 1.18. Russia’s abatement and total cost under monopoly scenario 
Year Emissions AbatementCost
Price of 
Permit
Permits
Sold
Banked 
Permits
Total 
Cost 
Present 
Value
2010 2208 0 20.54 0 0 0 -4,864
2011 2240 5749 22.64 487 0 -5169 
2012 2272 5418 24.76 455 0 -5622 
2013 2304 5102 26.92 423 0 -5926 
2014 2336 4800 29.11 391 0 -6089 
2015 2367 4511 31.34 359 0 -6115 
2016 2399 4235 33.60 328 0 -6010 
2017 2431 3971 35.69 96 0 486 
2018 2463 3720 37.82 64 0 1117 
2019 2495 3480 39.99 32 0 1845 
2020 2527 3250 42.18 0 0 2666 
2021 2527 3250 44.44 0 0 2614 
2022 2527 3250 46.77 0 0 2563 
2023 2527 3250 49.17 0 0 2513 
2024 2527 3250 51.64 0 0 2463 
2025 2527 3250 45.84 0 0 2415 
2026 2527 3250 45.84 0 0 2368 
2027 2527 3250 45.84 0 0 2321 
2028 2527 3250 45.84 0 0 2276 
2029 2527 3250 45.84 0 0 2231 
2030 2527 3250 45.84 0 0 2187 
     Note: emissions are in million tons, permits in dollars, cost in million dollars, negative cost can be c    
     consider as benefit, there won’t be any permits when Russia able to sell all the permits. 
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Table 1.19. Russia’s abetment and total cost under cooperative scenario 
Year Emissions 
Abatement
Cost
Price of 
Permit
permits 
sold
Banked 
Permits
Total 
Cost PV
2010 2208 0 14.58 0 0 0 25,988.05
2011 2240 5749 14.85 487 0 -1450 
2012 2272 5418 15.11 455 0 -1401 
2013 2304 5102 15.38 423 0 -1325 
2014 2336 4800 15.65 391 0 -1223 
2015 2367 4511 15.92 359 0 -1097 
2016 2399 4235 16.19 328 0 -949 
2017 2431 3971 16.44 96 0 2089 
2018 2463 3720 16.68 64 0 2267 
2019 2495 3480 16.93 32 0 2460 
2020 2527 3250 18.13 0 0 2666 
2021 2527 3250 21.65 0 0 2614 
2022 2527 3250 21.65 0 0 2563 
2023 2527 3250 21.65 0 0 2513 
2024 2527 3250 21.65 0 0 2463 
2025 2527 3250 21.65 0 0 2415 
2026 2527 3250 21.65 0 0 2368 
2027 2527 3250 21.65 0 0 2321 
2028 2527 3250 21.65 0 0 2276 
2029 2527 3250 21.65 0 0 2231 
2030 2527 3250 21.65 0 0 2187 
Note: emissions are in million tons, permits in dollars, cost in million dollars, negative cost can be     
consider as benefit, there won’t be any permits when Russia able to sell all the permits. 
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Table 1.20. Russia’s abatement and total cost in response to the monopsony price 
Year Emission 
Abatement 
Cost 
Price of 
Permit
Permits 
Sold
Banked 
Permits
Total 
Cost 
Present 
Value
2010 2208 11.07 40,747.22
2011 2240 5749 10.60 487 0 577 
2012 2272 5418 10.14 455 0 772 
2013 2304 5102 9.70 423 0 940 
2014 2336 4800 9.27 391 0 1083 
2015 2367 4511 8.86 359 0 1202 
2016 2399 4235 8.46 328 0 1300 
2017 2431 3971 8.08 96 0 2785 
2018 2463 3720 7.71 64 0 2755 
2019 2495 3480 7.36 32 0 2715 
2020 2527 3250 7.02 0 0 2666 
2021 2527 3250 6.69 0 0 2614 
2022 2527 3250 6.39 0 0 2563 
2023 2527 3250 6.09 0 0 2513 
2024 2527 3250 5.81 0 0 2463 
2025 2527 3250 5.55 0 0 2415 
2026 2527 3250 5.30 0 0 2368 
2027 2527 3250 5.07 0 0 2321 
2028 2527 3250 4.85 0 0 2276 
2029 2527 3250 4.64 0 0 2231 
2030 2527 3250 4.45 0 0 2187 
Note: emissions are in million tons, permits in dollars, cost in million dollars, negative cost can be     
consider as benefit, there won’t be any permits when Russia able to sell all the permits. 
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 CHAPTER 2                                                                                     
PRICE DYNAMICS OF CARBON EMISSION ALLOWANCES AT THE CHICAGO 
CLIMATE EXCHANGE 
2.1  Introduction 
For the past twenty years climate change and global warming have become major 
environmental concerns. Scientists and policy makers have arrived at a consensus that 
greenhouse gases (GHG) including hydrocarbons, nitrogen oxides, and carbon dioxide 
negatively impact earth’s atmosphere (Madden and Ramanathan, 1980; Meehl and 
Washington, 1996). Since these effects are global, climate experts have suggested a 
global response which should be mediated by international agreements. At the Kyoto 
global conference held in 1997, a group of 41 industrial and economies-in-transition 
nations (called Annex I countries) agreed to reduce their carbon emission level by 5.2 
percent from the 1990 level for the period 2005-2012 (UNFCCC, 2010). The United 
States (US), then the largest emitter of GHGs, did not sign the agreement and make any 
formal commitment to lower GHG emission, much to the dissatisfaction of the 
international community. However, irrespective of the US federal government 
involvement, several voluntary and mandatory cap-and-trading emissions markets have 
emerged regionally and nationally.  
In 2003, with the help of Joyce Foundation and Northwestern University, the 
Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX), a voluntary emissions trading market started.  The 
CCX market initially began its trading operations with 13 companies and expanded its 
operation to more than 450 companies by the time it closed its operation in 2010. The 
participation in the market was voluntary but the participants had to commit to a legally 
binding requirement of meeting annual GHG emissions reduction targets. Those who 
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reduce below the targets have surplus allowances to sell or bank; those who emit above 
the targets comply by purchasing CCX Carbon Financial Instruments. During the 
operation of this market a total of 700 million tons of carbon credits were transacted. As a 
result of political and administrative issues, the CCX market was shut-down in December 
2010.  
In 2005, ten northeastern states (Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, and Vermont) 
agreed to implement the first mandatory emissions trading market, the Regional 
Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) in the United States. The program RGGI has started its 
operation in September 2008. RGGI market set a cap on carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions 
of certain electricity producers in the region. The RGGI is an auction based market and so 
far more than 250 million carbon allowances were traded in twelve auctions (RGGI, 
2012)16. 
In  2007, two more state-controlled emission trading programs emerged.  The 
Western Climate Initiative (WCI), seven western states (Arizona, California, New 
Mexico, Montana, Oregon, Utah, and Washington) formed a group and established a 
regional greenhouse gas emissions trading system, and states Alaska, Colorado, Idaho, 
Kansas, Nevada, and Wyoming have joined as observers. The first phase of WCI is 
scheduled to begin in 2012. The other program, the Midwestern Greenhouse Gas 
Reduction Accord (MGGRA) was formed by six states,  Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, 
Minnesota, and Wisconsin, and states, Indiana, Ohio, and South Dakota  are observers. 
The operation of the MGGRA program will begin in 2012 as well. With these new trading 
                                                 
16 http://www.rggi.org/market/co2_auctions/results 
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programs, the United States federal government,  recently have been taken some crucial 
steps. The United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is expected to act for 
the first time to regulate carbon dioxide and other GHGs. The 111th Congress has 
introduced several market-based climate change bills, the Liberman-Warner bill and The 
Waxman-Markey Climate Change bill are the popular ones. 
The Lieberman-Warner bill or Climate Security Act of 2007 (S.2191, 2007) was 
introduced to create a national cap-and-trade policy for greenhouse gas emissions and 
allocate right-to-emit credits to the polluters, restricting their annual amount of 
greenhouse gas emissions. The bill proposed a reduction of emissions 70 percent below 
2005 levels by 2050. The Waxman–Markey Climate Change bill, known as American 
Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 (H.R. 2454)  aims to implement a federal cap and 
trade system for GHG by reducing the emissions by three percent below 2005 levels in 
2012, 20 percent below 2005 levels in 2020, 42 percent below 2005 levels in 2030, and 
83 percent below 2005 levels in 2050 (Kim and Koo, 2010). However, both bills did not 
make any progress as a result of the recent political and economic uncertainties. But 
investors expect that the United States will come up with a cap-and-trade policy in the 
near future.  
Given the importance of these newly emerging markets (CCX, RGGI, WCI and 
MGGRA), it is necessary to examine the price behavior and volatility of the returns. Such 
an examination is especially important to the risk investors and members who are 
involved in the market to buy or sell emission allowances and their derivatives (Benz and 
Trück, 2009). In particulary, in this essay I examine the price dynamics of CCX and 
discuss various reasons for the slowdown of the market, CCX is the first voluntary 
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emission market and stands to serve as a real test run for other emerging and future 
voluntary and mandatory carbon markets.   
Examining the price behavior and volatility of returns of tradable emission 
allowances is not new to the literature. In the United States, most studies have focused on 
electricity demand and emission allowances under the Acid Rain Program of US 
Environmental Protection Agency (Benz and Trück, 2009).  
 Studies analyzing the US emission market are limited. Sabbaghi and Sabbaghi 
(2011) explored a relationship between price of CCX emission credits and trade volume 
and suggested that generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity17 (GARCH) 
effects were highly persistent and statistically significant during the study period. Kim 
and Koo (2010) analyzed the dynamics of US carbon allowance trading using the 
autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) approach. They found that the price of coal was 
the major driving force to determine the spot prices and trading volume in the US 
emission market. They also found that prices of crude oil and natural gas had a significant 
effect in the short run on the spot prices but had little effect in the long run. Other than 
these two studies, I haven’t come across any study which examines the price dynamics of 
the Chicago Climate Exchange. Whereas for EU ETS, quite a few studies have 
investigated the spot price behavior (Benz and Trück, 2009; Daskalakis and Markellos, 
2009; Paolella and Taschini, 2008; Seifertet et al., 2008; Uhrig-Homburg and Wagner, 
2006; 2007).  
                                                 
17 GARCH model is widely used in the areas of risk, portifilo managements, asset pricing, option pricing 
and exchnage rate volatility. This model helps to model the excess kutosis and volatility of the returns. 
 
 
 74 
 
Like other financial asset markets, the EU ETS, a new class of asset markets has 
experienced price fluctuations in response to the market uncertainties. Daskalakis et al.  
(2009) found a significant implication for the derivative pricing from the prohibition of 
banking of emission allowances in EU ETS. They also discovered that market participants 
adopted standard no-arbitrage pricing using spot and futures prices. Paolella and Taschini 
(2008) provided an econometric analysis for unconditional tail behavior and the 
heteroskedastic dynamics of returns of EU ETS and US’s SO2  allowances. Their study 
proposed the use of stable-GARCH models. Uhrig-Homburg and Wagner (2006) 
investigated the relationship between spot and futures markets in the European Union 
Emissions Trading System (EU ETS). The EU ETS findings demonstrated that EU 
allowances futures maturing within a trading period were suitable instruments for hedging 
related risks. 
Seifert et al. (2008) developed a stochastic equilibrium model and analyzed the 
resulting  spot price dynamics of the EU ETS. They found that seasonal patterns have no 
effect on  prices. The  process should possess the martingale property and an adequate  
price process should exhibit a time- and price-dependent volatility structure. Benz and 
Trück (2009) evaluated price volatility and density forecasts allowing for 
heteroskedasticity using ARCH, GARCH and regime-switching models in  markets; their 
findings revealed that EU ETS had different volatility behavior in different phases. They 
also observed  asymmetry, excess kurtosis and heavy tails in the EU ETS emission 
allowances.  
The primary goal of my paper is to model the extreme tail behavior of CCX 
returns, recognizing that the traditional mean-variance analysis is not adequate.  I also 
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recognize that there was a possible switch in the underlying stability condition of the 
fluctuations in the market return overtime. The paper then addresses several key questions 
of interest to risk managers, CCX investors, and policy makers. Was the switch in the 
underlying stability condition or the risk regime as a result of unstable economic 
conditions and/or shift in the political regime?  As the CCX market ultimately came to a 
full halt in 2010, it is important to measure the degree of volatility in market returns 
during the final months of the market crash. Following Benz and Trück (2009), I observe 
negative skewness and excess kurtosis in the CCX returns, and then relate these market 
anomalies to changing international and national climate change debates and regulations.  
While identifying the above relationships I also ask to what extent the CCX market was 
influenced by other emerging carbon market in the US.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 explains the setup of new asset 
class market, Chicago Climate Exchange; in this section I provide the participating 
members information and their roles in the market. Section 2.3 explains the methodology 
used in this paper.  I discuss two different methodologies, GARCH and Markov Regime 
Switching (MRS) models used to estimate the volatility in returns of the CCX spot price 
trading.  Section 2.4 provides the data and empirical results estimated using the above 
methodologies. Section 2.5 suggest different mechanisms for the emerging markets to 
resolve the operational and policy related to issues.  Finally, section 2.6 provides the 
conclusion of the paper.  
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2.2  The functioning of the Chicago Climate Exchange  
The Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX) was the world’s first voluntary and legally 
binding  greenhouse gas reduction trading system. The trading market operated from 
December 2003 to December 2010. During this period the CCX was committed to 
reducing Greenhouse Gases (GHGs) in two phases. During Phase I (2003 – 2006), as per 
the regulation of the CCX market,  the members were bound to reduce four percent below 
the average of their 1998-2001 emissions level. During Phase II (beginning in 2007), all 
the members who participated were supposed to reduce six percent below their 2000 
emission level.  
The baseline emissions were given to the members at the time of signing the 
contract with the CCX. The exchange was regulated by the National Association of 
Security Dealers (NASD).  Based on the emission levels, the members can either buy or 
sell the permits in a legally binding trading platform, for transparency, all the transactions 
are carefully verified and monitored by an independent third party (Schnapf LLC, 
2011)18.  
The exchange had more than 450 members when it was closed. As mentioned in 
the CCX webpage, this exchange was categorized into four membership categories. 
Members, who emit or generate GHGs through their activities, such as power plants, 
cement, and steel industries. When members sign the contract with CCX, they make a 
legally binding commitment to reduce the emissions and allow CCX authorized verifier to 
verify their annual emissions. Registry Participant Members are entities with direct GHG 
                                                 
18http://www.environmental-law.net/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/pub-4-VoluntaryGHGEmissionPrivate-
SectorTradingMarkets.pdf 
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emissions that establish a CCX Registry account of their emissions and undergo data 
verification by a third party verifier. Associate Members are office-based businesses or 
institutions with negligible direct GHG emissions. Offset Providers are the owners of title 
to qualifying offset projects that sequester, destroy or reduce GHG emissions. Offset 
Providers register and sell offsets directly on the CCX. 
The participant members belonged to different groups. About 25 percent of 
members were from the United States power utilities, 17 percent part of the Dow Jones 
Industrials, and 11 percent Fortune 100 companies. Multi-national corporations like Ford, 
DuPont, and Motorola, cities such as Oakland and Chicago, educational institutions such 
as University of California, San Diego, Tufts University, Michigan State University and 
University of Minnesota were members as well. Figure 1 presents the distribution of 
members across the United States. It is evident from the figure that more than 60 percent 
of the total members were located in the north-east region19.  This had an important 
implication for the CCX market, which I will return to later in the paper. 
                                                 
19 CCX members list obtained from www.chicagoclimatex.com 
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           Figure 2.1. Participated Members - Chicago Climate Exchange  
          ( Source: Chicago Climate Exchange, www.chicagoclimatex.com) 
The members whose emissions do not meet annual emission reduction targets 
must use banked allowances from previous years or purchase carbon allowance which is 
called as Carbon Financial Instruments (CFI). Each CFI credit represents 100 metric tons 
of equivalents. Each participant member gets reduction target in the beginning of their 
contract and monitored continuously. The member has to report the yearly emissions to 
the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), which provides independent 
regulatory oversight to the CCX.  
The CFI contract consists of an exchange allowance and an exchange offset. 
Exchange allowances are issued to members on the basis of their emission levels. The 
members who are beyond their reduction level can buy credits from other members who 
have surplus allowances or buy from offset providers (CCX, 2005).  In 2007, with the 
starting of the Phase II program, CCX allowed several offset providers from agricultural 
methane emission reduction projects, landfill methane emission reduction projects, coal 
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mine methane emission reduction projects, agricultural and rangeland soil carbon 
reduction projects, forestry carbon reduction projects, and offsets from renewable energy. 
These providers had to be approved, verified and reviewed by the FINRA before they 
were available for trading (Kim and Koo, 2010). 
An offset provider is one, who has an offset project involving more than 10,000 
metric tons of carbon dioxide  (CO2) per year can sell offsets on its own behalf, if offset 
provider has project involving less than 10,000 metric tons of carbon dioxide can sell 
through an offset aggregator. An offset aggregator is one, who represents for multiple 
offset generating projects. Smaller offset projects may be registered through an offset 
aggregator (CCX, 2005). 
Unlike other trading markets, CCX trading is not conducted through brokers.  
Instead, the transactions are made through electronic trading platform, which is an online 
trading floor linked with the CCX registry. The online market gives live information of 
quotes posted by members.  
There are three transaction methods: a traditional exchange-cleared offer and bid 
system, an electronic exchange for agreements between the members of CCX and per-
negotiated cash transactions (Schnapf LLC, 2011). Exchange-cleared transactions are 
completed on the trade day while the bilateral agreements are settled according to the 
requirements of the participating parties. All trade settlements are made in U.S. dollar 
amounts20.  
                                                 
20 http://science.howstuffworks.com/, www.chicagoclimatex.com/ 
 80 
 
2.3 Modeling the volatility of CCX returns  
The market prices of carbon are dependent on a number of economic, 
environmental and regulatory factors.  Burtraw and Jo (2009) grouped price determinants 
of emission credits into two categories: (i) regulatory determinants and (ii) market 
determinants. Regulatory determinants refer to the factors such as market caps, 
compliance mechanism, third party verification, voluntary versus mandatory 
participation, etc. These factors are known to shape the carbon market mostly in the short 
term and are the better predictors of extreme events in the short-term markets.   
On the other hand, market determinants relate to the alternative supply of 
allowances, and emission abatement technology and costs, which have impact on the 
carbon prices in the long term.  As noted earlier, the focus of this paper is not to model 
the cause and effect of carbon price dynamics, but rather model the price volatility of the 
CCX market during its short existence. The approach I take in this study is first to model 
the temporal aspects of extreme variations and then to relate that variation to known 
historical changes in regulatory and market conditions.  Such an approach has been found 
simple and extremely useful for investors as well as policy makers. I choose the models of 
GARCH and regime-switching for CCX returns. First I estimate the volatility using 
GARCH (1,1), and then observe that CCX spot prices have two phases and that both have 
different volatility structure in returns. So, later I attempt the regime-switching model to 
estimate separate phases with different underlying stochastic processes. 
                                                                                       
  
 81 
 
2.3.1 GARCH Modeling  
Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity (ARCH) and Generalized 
Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity (GARCH) models are widely used in 
estimating volatility of the financial return. Engle (1982) introduced the original form of 
ARCH and Bollerslev (1986) extended a generalized version of ARCH process. The 
relevance and underlying assumptions of these models for this paper are that the market 
returns of carbon go through different periods of normal price fluctuations interspersed by 
volatile drops or spikes that are heteroskedastic in nature. Following Benz and Truck 
(2009), and Daskalakis et al. (2009), I begin by estimating log-returns with first order 
autoregressive conditional mean, i.e., a GARCH (p,q) conditional variance specification, 
and normally distributed innovations21. Formally,  
ݕ௧ ൌ ܿ଴ ൅ ܿଵݕ௧ିଵ ൅ ߝ௧                         (2.1) 
Where equation (2.1) represents a first order auto regressive process and ݕ௧ denotes  a 
random variable drawn from a conditional density function and ߝ௧ is white noise with a 
mean zero and variance ߪ௧ଶ. Now the GARCH (p,q) model for the time series ߝ௧ can be 
expressed as  
ߝ௧ ൌ ߪ௧ݖ௧	                                           (2.2) 
ߪ௧ଶ ൌ ܽ଴ ൅ ∑ ܽ௜ߝ௧ି௜ଶ௣௜ୀ଴ ൅ ∑ ௝ܾߪ௧ି௝ଶ௤௝ୀଵ 							      (2.3)                             
ݖ௧			݅݅݀		ܰ	ሺ0,1ሻ         (2.4) 
Variable ߪ௧ଶ represents the conditional variance of error term (ߝ௧) given ௧ܸ ൌ ߝ௧ିଵ, ߝ௧ିଶ, …, 
                                                 
21 The difference between the observed value at time t and the forecast value  based on information 
available prior to time t is known as innovation . If the difference is zero then we can say the series cosists 
of white noise or stationary, i.e., ߝ௧ is normally distributed with zero mean and costant variance. 
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and equation (2.4) tells that ݖ௧		are independent and identically distributed with the mean 
equal to zero and the variance equal to one. The parameters of the model 
(ܽ଴, ܽଵ, … , ܽ௣, ܾଵ, … , ܾ௤ሻ are restricted in way to get  ߪ௧ ൐ 0. In order to examine the fat 
tail behavior, I assume that ݖ௧  allows a fourth moment, this assumption allows us to 
estimate the kurtosis of the errors (ߝ௧) (Bai et al., 2001).   
The probability density function for the residuals is assumed to be the standard 
normal distribution with density function ݂ሺݖ௧ሻ ൌ ଵ√ଶగ ݁ି௭೟
మ
. The AR(1) conditional mean 
is assumed to take into consideration the non-synchronous trading effect (Hamilton 1994). 
To check the best model for volatility of CCX, I estimate the AR(1)−GARCH(p,q) for the 
equation (2.1) where p=0,1,2 and q=1,2,3. For a sample of “T” observations, the 
estimated parameter can be written as,  
߱ሺ்ሻ ൌ ሺܿ଴ሺ்ሻ, ܿଵሺ்ሻ, ܽ଴ሺ்ሻ, ܽଵሺ்ሻ,⋯ , ܽ௤ሺ்ሻ, ܾଵሺ்ሻ,⋯ , ܾ௣ሺ்ሻሻ      (2.5) 
and conditional standard deviation estimations are computed as: 
ߪො௧ାଵ ൌ ටܽ଴ሺ்ሻ ൅ ∑ ܽ௜ሺ்ሻߝ௧ି௜ାଵଶ௤௜ୀଵ ൅ ∑ ௝ܾሺ்ሻߪ௧ି௝ାଵଶ௣௝ୀଵ                                                   (2.6) 
ߝ௧̂ ൌ ݕ௧ െ ܿ଴ሺ்ሻ െ ܿଵሺ்ሻݕ௧ିଵ                                                    (2.7) 
  The value ߪො௧ାଵ denotes the sample estimator of the conditional standard deviation at 
time t+1. ߝ௧̂	represents the shock in period t. The vector of the unknown parameters, ߱ሺ்ሻ, 
has been estimated on the basis of all the T available observations. I estimate Schwarz  
Bayesian criterion (SBC) to select the model that fits the data best (Schwarz, 1978).  
There are a number of criterion for model comparison. Bayesian  information criterion 
(BIC) is very popular in time series. It measures the quality of model and suggests an 
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adequate model. The models with lowest BIC is preferred to be a best model (Sparks and 
Yurova, 2006). The likelihood function of SBC can be written as 
ܵܤܥ ൌ െ ଶ் ܮ்൫ݕ௧;	 ෝ߱ሺ்ሻ൯ ൅
ఠෝ
் 		log	ሺܶሻ                                                  (2.8) 
where ܮ்ሺ. ሻ is the maximized value of the log-likelihood function,	 ෝ߱ is the MLE of ߱ 
derived from a sample of size T, and ෝ߱ሺ்ሻ denotes the dimension of ߱ .  
2.3.2  Regime-Switching Model 
Hamilton (1989,1990) introduced the regime switching models in the finance 
literature. In later studies, others have used Markov Switching to estimate the volatility 
(Hamilton, 2005; Kim et al., 2004; Kim and Nelson, 1999). Benz and Truck (2009) 
estimated Markov regime switching model for the European Union emissions trading 
system. Their findings reveal that Markovian models are more appropriate than GARCH 
modeling for the analysis of the short-term spot price behavior of carbon dioxide. In this 
paper I have adopted this methodology to identify structural change in the carbon market. 
The main feature of regime-switching model is the possibility for some or all the 
parameters to switch across different regimes. In the context of carbon market, the spot 
prices or returns of carbon dioxide emission allowances outcome depends on a number of 
variables, including weather and unquantifiable regulatory, policy and sociological 
factors. These factors can cause an unexpected and irrational buyout or lead to price 
jumps and periods of extreme volatility. Hence I assume that the switching mechanism 
between the states could be a result of these unobserved random variables.  
Assuming that the CCX market had more than one heterogeneous state during its 
tenure, the Markov Regime Switching model is formulated as below: 
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ݕ௧ ൌ ܿௌ௧ ൅ ߮ݕ௧ିଵ ൅ ߝ௧    (2.9) 
Where ܵ௧ ൌ 1⋯݇ is refered to as a state, and each state can stay for certain  time periods 
then jump to another state. More clearly, let us assume that there are two states, ܵ௧ ൌ 1 
for ݐ ൌ 1,2,… , ݐ଴  and ܵ௧ ൌ 2 for ݐ ൌ ݐ଴ ൅ 1, ݐ଴ ൅ 1,… A random shock ߝ௧, follows a 
normal distribution with zero mean and a variance. The intercept changes with the states, 
and therefore, we can say that intercept refers to switching states. The state is a random 
variable; it can be institutional, political,  policy or any other changes which influence the 
system. If there are k states, there will be k values for intercept  c and variance σ2.  Let us 
assume that equation (2.9)  has two states k = 2. 
ݕ௧ ൌ ܿଵ ൅ ߮ݕ௧ିଵ ൅ ߝ௧		 1statefor 			    (2.10) 
),0( 21σε ≈t           (2.11) 
ݕ௧ ൌ ܿଶ ൅ ߮ݕ௧ିଵ ൅ ߝ௧		 2statefor       (2.12) 
),0( 22σε ≈t           (2.13) 
The log-returns of the CCX spot prices have revealed that  pre-democratic (December 
2003- December 2007)  and democratic (January 2008 – December 2010) regimes of the 
United States government in 2000’s have had very different conditional variances and 
conditional means, leading us to believe there were two different regimes. Initially we do 
not observe nature of the state, i.e., high or low volatility. The property of Markov chains 
states that the current state only depends on the past through the most recent value. 
Probability theory plays a central role in determining the state and causes to change one 
state from other state. The general of expression of a two-state Markov chain is 
represented as: 
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Pr൫ܵ௧ ൌ ݆หܵ௧ିଵ ൌ ݅, ܵ௧ିଶ ൌ ݇,⋯ݕ௧ିଵ,ݕ௧ିଶ,⋯ ൯ ൌ Pr	ሺሺܵ௧ ൌ ݆|ܵ௧ିଵ ൌ ݅ሻ ൌ ݌௜௝    (2.14) 
Between the periods of time t and t+1,  the probability of a switch from state 1 to state 2 is 
given by ݌ଵଶ, and   the  probability of staying in state 2 is given by ݌ଶଶ. Equation (2.14) 
assumes that the probability of a change in regime depends on the past only through the 
value of the most recent regime. A probability of ݌ଶଶ ൌ 1  refers a permanent shift or 
change, but in general we can see a possibility of ݌ଶଶ ൏ 1 (Hamilton 2005). In a two state 
regime model, the transition probability matrix can be written as,  
 ቂ݌ଵଵ ݌ଶଵ݌ଵଶ ݌ଶଶቃ ൌ ൤
݌ ሺ1 െ ݍሻ
ሺ1 െ ݌ሻ ݍ ൨ 
and the unconditional probability of being in the state 1 is given by ߨଵ ൌ ሺଵି௤ሻሺଶି௣ି௤ሻ 
(Hamilton 1994). 
2.4  Data and Empirical Results  
2.4.1  Data 
In this section I present the empirical results of the price dynamics of the Chicago 
Climate Exchange (CCX). The empirical price dynamics model used the daily closing 
spot price of CCX for the period from December 2003-December 2010. A total of 1783 
observations i.e. daily closing spot prices were obtained from the CCX web page. The 
data are divided in two parts: the first 1020 observations (from December 12, 2003 to 
December 31, 2007) were considered as pre-democratic regime, while the remaining 763 
observations (from January 1, 2008 to December 31, 2010) were taken as the democratic 
regime. 
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The CCX carbon trading started in Dec 2003 with a price of $0.96 per ton of 
carbon dioxide. During the period Jan 2004 – Dec 2007 the market has experienced a 
steady growth in the prices; for this period the prices ranged from $1 per ton to $4 per ton. 
However, the situation changed after January 2008; the prices went up very rapidly.  
Between January 2008 and June 2008 prices of carbon units traded on the CCX market 
were as high as $7.50 per ton carbon dioxide at one time, but later collapsed to around $2 
per ton in the next 6 months. The sudden downfall of the spot price indicates that the 
carbon market was highly volatile as a result of political reasons, management decisions 
and other competitive trading markets. It appears that the investors of CCX responded 
favorably in early 2008 to the presidential election, in anticipation of a win by the 
democratic party.  They expected that the Obama government would come up with a new 
cap-and-trade program in the United States. When the Congress delayed the cap-and-trade 
bill later in the year; investors stopped buying the credits. Figure 2.2 shows a plot of spot 
prices and the price fluctuations of the CCX market. 
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                    Figure 2.2. Daily closing prices of CCX from Dec 2003 - 2010 
 
Before estimating the empirical model, daily closing spot prices (xt) were 
converted to “log-returns” which can be expressed as	ݕ௧ ൌ logሺݔ௧ሻ െ log	ሺݔ௧ିଵሻ for the 
period Dec 2003-Dec 2010. Table 2.1 descriptive statistics of log-returns for different 
periods of CCX. Looking at the descriptive statistics, we can say that kurtosis is 
significantly higher than the kurtosis of a normal distribution of 3 indicating that fat-tailed 
distributions are necessary to correctly describe the log-returns’ conditional distribution. 
Volatility clustering, or alternation between periods of high and low volatility, is clearly 
visible in the figure thus suggesting the presence of heteroskedasticity. Figure 2.3 
provides the log returns of the full sample.         
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Table 2.1. Summary statistics of log-returns, for different periods of CCX 
 
Pre- 
Democratic 
(Dec 2003 – Dec 
2007 
Democratic 
(Jan 2008 – Dec 
2010) 
Full 
Sample 
Dec2003-Dec 
2010 
N 1020 763 1783 
Mean 0.0701 -0.4782 -0.1658 
Median 0 0 0 
Max 12.93 27.19 27.19 
Min -20.86 -63.25 -63.25 
Std.dev 2.659 5.331 4.036 
Skewness -0.241 -3.23 -3.357 
Kurtosis 14.512 39.996 54.686 
.   
 
                   Figure 2.3. Daily CCX log-returns for the period Dec 2003 - Dec 2010 
                 Note: Y-axis log-returns, X-axis represents days of trading  
2.4.2 Estimated results of  GARCH (1,1) 
I have estimated different models and selected the best model based on Schwarz 
Bayesian criterion. Table 2.2 gives the best fit models for pre-democratic and democratic 
period samples. I have used Eviews package to estimate GARCH modeling. On the basis 
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of the computed SBC values, GARCH(1,1) has the lowest computed value in both the 
samples and therefore, it is the best model fit among all the computed models.  
Table 2.2. SBC for the pre-democratic (Dec 2003- Dec 2007) and  democratic (Jan 2008 - 
Dec 2010) sample 
Model Pre-democratic Democratic 
ARCH(1) 4.678567 6.179098 
ARCH(2) 4.670092 6.172519 
ARCH(3) 4.654806 6.176125 
GARCH(1,1) 4.594127 6.146481 
GARCH(1,2) 4.594260 6.195569 
GARCH (1,3) 4.600632 6.253090 
GARCH(2,1) 4.598480 6.155542 
GARCH(2,2) 4.600500 6.218946 
Note: Lowest value of the SBC corresponds  to a best model 
 
Table 2.3 presents the parameters of the GARCH (1,1) model.  I observe that the 
estimated conditional variance increased substantially when the market experienced 
extreme positive or negative returns. Benz and Truck (2009) had observed similar 
phenomena in the case of EU ETS. The autoregressive parameter is not statistically 
significant in both samples, providing no evidence of non-synchronous trading effect22 
and  shows that spot prices I used in the analysis have equally spaced time intervals. The 
conditional variance parameters, however, are statistically significant.  
 
                                                 
22 If the market experiences a first order serial correlation, one can say that this is due to nonsynchronus 
trading effect (Perry 1985).  According to Levy (2006), “The nonsynchronus trading effect arises when data 
is assumed to be recorded at certain times when in fact it is collected at other times. As an example the daily 
closing security prices, which give the last transaction price for each security on the previous day, do not 
occur at the same time each day. By referring to these values as daily closing prices we incorrectly assume 
that the occur at equally spaced time intervals”. 
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Table 2.3. Parameter estimates of GARCH(1,1) model for pre-democratic               
period Dec 2003 - Dec 2007 and democratic period Jan 2008-Dec 2010.  
Coefficient Pre-democratic Democratic 
c0 0.000764 
(0.0621) 
-0.3004 
(0.1899) 
c1 0.035 
(0.042) 
0.1958*** 
(0.055) 
a0 0.304*** 
(0.021) 
0.6309 
(0.939) 
a1 0.0948*** 
(0.034) 
0.0177** 
(0.011) 
b1 0.868*** 
(0.049) 
0.9614*** 
(0.043) 
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis, *** indicate statistical significance level of 1%, ** indicate  
5%  and * indicate 10% . 
 
The sum of the coefficients on the lagged squared innovation and lagged 
conditional variance, i.e., the estimated volatility persistence, of ܽଵ ൅ ܾଵ ൐ 0.95,		reveals  
that shocks to the variance are highly persistence in the both models. In both samples the 
estimated coefficients ܾଵ are around 0.9, and statistically different from zero. These 
results suggest that large values of ߪ௧ିଵଶ   were followed by large values of ߪ௧ଶ , and small 
values of ߪ௧ିଵଶ  were followed by small values of ߪ௧ଶ. Such results are commonly found in 
other financial asset markets as well. Both models have different means and conditional 
variances, indicating that in-sample forecasting will not give proper prediction of the the 
out-sample.  Figure 2.4 shows the conditional variances of these two models. 
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    Figure 2.4. Conditional variances of the pre-democratic and  democratic periods 
 
When we look at the figure 2.4, we can observe that pre-democratic period has more 
stable spikes than the democratic period. There is a clear shift from pre-democratic period 
to democratic period. Lamoreux and Lastrapes (1990) , Susmel (1999) suggested that this 
type of behavior of conditional variance is mainly because of regime shift. Susmel (1999) 
argue the regime shifts might be due to market crashes, economic recession or changes in 
government policies. Further Samuel (1999) suggested that the regular ARCH models are 
not adequate enough to model the volatility behavior of the market when conditional 
variance changes with the regime shifts. To model the volatility by capturing the regime 
shifts, Hamilton and Susmel (1994) proposed another class of ARCH models, the regime-
switching models. The regime switching model allow all the parameters of the ARCH 
process of different regimes, where the transitions between any two regimes processed by 
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an unobserved Markov chain. In the following section I estimate volatility through 
Markov Regime Switching model. 
2.4.3  Estimated results of Markov regime switching model  
I have used Oxmetric’s PCgive package and MS-regress package (Perlin 2010) to 
estimate the regime switching model. The parameters of estimated two regime-switching 
model are presented in table 2.4.  We can see that parameters of state  2 are larger than the 
state 1 parameters, this is because of large number of zero returns followed by high 
positive or negative returns. More than 60 percent of the data were zero returns, which 
meant that the spot prices did not change much unless there was either positive or 
negative shock to the market. I also observed high positive and negative returns when 
there was a discussion on climate change in the Congress.  From these observations we 
can conclude that the market is highly volatile with any political discussion on climate 
change issue. ߪଵ is very small compared to ߪଶ, clearly indicating that both states have 
different phases of returns.    
Table 2.4. Estimation results for log-returns with two-state regime-switching                     
model with Gaussian distribution  
 
Regime 
Parameter estimates 
ܥ௜
 
߶ ߪ௜
 
݌௜௜
 
State 1 (i=1) -7.53E-07 
 
 
1.62E-06 
(2.49E-06) 
3.59E-06*** 0.7476*** 
(1.17E-06) (2.39E-06) (0.013) 
 
State 2 (i=2)      2.418*** 10.576*** 0.7649*** 
  (0.469)   (0.428)   (0.012) 
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis, *** indicate statistical significance level of 1%, ** indicate 5%  
and * indicate 10% . 
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State 2 has higher volatile periods yielding a higher mean and variance in the returns. 
Using the transitions probabilities we can estimate the unconditional probabilities of each 
regime, which reflect how much time the market experienced each regime. Unconditional 
probability of state 1 is  ߨଵ ൌ ଵି௣మమଶି௣భభି௣మమ and state 2’s unconditional probability is 1 െ ߨଵ. 
The computed probabilities are 0.48 for state 1 and 0.52 for state 2. The unconditional 
probability of state 2 explains that more than half of the total trading days have 
experienced a high volatility in returns.  
For the most part of phase I (2003-2006) the market had low volatility of returns 
except for few days. In 2004, the estimated trading volume was 2.4 million tons of carbon 
dioxide, and the trading prices were around $1.0 - $1.7 per permit. During the first half of 
2005 the price was quite stable but started rising in the second half of 2005. In June 2005, 
Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee voted 66-29 in favor of the Senate 
resolution on climate change (CCX 2006), which probably made investors to buy more 
credits in the second half of year 2005. The market experienced 77 per cent growth in 
prices and 600 percent growth in trade volume compared to year 2004. A total of 14.5 
million tons of carbon dioxide were traded in 2005, of which about 80 percent were 
traded just in the second half of the year. Figure 2.5 shows the total volume and price of 
carbon credits for each trading period. This situation continued throughout the year 2006. 
Sabbaghi and Sabbaghi (2011) found smoother volatility in returns between the years 
2003 - 2006.  
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Phase II period started in 2007 and ended in 2010. In figure 2.5, I plot smoothed 
probabilities of regime switching model. State 1, represented by the dotted path, reflects a 
low volatility state. On the other hand, state 2, represented by a solid path, represents a 
high volatility. The sudden spikes are evident of the fact that a higher degree of volatility 
persisted during that state. During the primary presidential election debate in 2007, the 
Republican party candidates, John McCain and Mike Huckabee, and the Democratic party  
 
 
candidates, John Edwards, Hillary Clinton, and Barack Obama, all favored a cap and 
trade system (CCX, 2007). Candidate Obama had insisted for a system that would auction 
100 percent of the allowances at its inception. Investors predicted that the upcoming 
federal government would come up with a strong climate change bill and started buying 
Figure 2.5. Log-returns, conditional standard deviations and smoothed probabilities of 
regimes of CCX from Dec 2003 to Dec 2010. 
Note: Panel 1 gives the log-retrurns, panel 2 give conditional variances and panel 3 gives the smoothed 
probabilities of state 1 (low volatility) and state 2 (higy volatility) 
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the credits. Within a month the market experienced more than 75 percent jump in prices; 
prices rose from $2.45 per metric ton at the end of January to $4.50 per metric ton on 
February 29, 2008. A total of 11.34 metric tons of carbon credits traded in the month of 
February, which accounted 50 percent of total volume traded in the year 2007.  
The market had crossed its previous year’s total traded volume in the month of April; 
spot prices reached to $6.45 per metric ton. The rally continued until the month of May. 
In the month of May, spot price reached to $7.40 per metric ton, which is the maximum in 
the history of CCX.  But the market price was drastically declined to 10 cents in the later 
periods and consequently the market was shut down in Dec 2010. I identified three major 
factors which influenced this market debacle.  
First, Lieberman-Warner bill, or popularly known as Climate Security Act of 2007, 
was introduced to create a national cap-and-trade policy for greenhouse gas emissions and 
allocate right-to-emit credits to the polluters, restricting their annual amount of 
greenhouse gas emissions (S.2191, 2007). The Climate Security Act of 2007 was 
proposed in October 2007. The bill was approved by US Senate Committee on 
Environmetal and Public in Dec 2007 and forwarded to the Senate for discussion. The bill 
primarily targeted power, transportation and industrial sectors and proposed a reduction of 
emissions 70 percent below 2005 levels by 2050 (Murray and Ross, 2007; S.2191, 2007). 
The Senate debated this bill in June 2008 and disapproved. Investors expected that there 
would be a huge demand for credits if the bill had been passed in the Senate. Between 
Dec 2007 and June 2008, a total of 48 million tons of carbon credits traded and the price 
rose from $2 to $7.40. When the Senate disapproved the bill, investors probably became 
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defensive and stopped trading, and consequently, prices touched $1 by the end of the year 
2008. We can visually confirm this situation in figure 2.6. 
 
                   Figure 2.6. CCX daily settlement price and volume  
                  Note: Prices are reported in dollars and traded volume in metric tons 
Second, CCX had adapted an offset provision.  Its members agreed to legally-binding 
reductions and traded Carbon Financial Instruments (CFIs). These CFIs were either offset 
credits or allowance-based credits, issued to emitting members according to their baseline 
emissions. According to CCX, offset users had constituted 12 percent of the program’s 
total reductions; the majority of the members’ green reductions (88%) were made at 
members’ facilities (Bloomberg, 2010). During Phase I, CCX allowed 6 million tons of 
offsets. This number increased to 22.3 million tons in 2007 and 30.99 million tons in year 
2008. This excess supply might have caused the price drop. 
Third, the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiate (RGGI) might have been the most recent 
contributor to the CCX downfall.  RGGI, the first mandatory emissions trading scheme in 
the U.S., requires coal-fired power plants in ten U.S. Northeast and Mid-Atlantic states 
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(Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, 
New York, Rhode Island, and Vermont) to cut greenhouse gas emissions by 10 percent 
from the 2009-2014 annual cap level of 188 million short tons by 2018. The first RGGI 
auction was held on September 25, 2008, offering 12.5 million allowances (representing 
12.5 million short tons of CO2 ) from six of the ten states involved in the program. Fifty-
nine participants from the energy, financial, and environmental sectors participated. The 
auction clearing price for the RGGI allowances was $3.07 per ton.  During this period the 
market price of CCX dropped to $1.6 per ton of carbon credits. I found that 15 large 
industries of the RGGI participants were also members of the CCX (see figure 2.1). The 
CCX trade volume was low whenever the RGGI auction took place. 
2.5 Policy and financial lessons from CCX and suggested mechanisms to other climate 
exchange markets 
In the aftermath of the collapse of CCX market, may have raised the policy question: 
could the government have done anything about it?  Some believe that it is very important 
to provide suitable mechanisms for the emerging markets to resolve the operational and 
policy related to issues. CCX was shut down its operations in December 2010, as 
mentioned in the above section; the main reasons for the collapse of the market were 
excess supply of offset permits and political ambiguity on the cap and trade. Even though 
the market was closed, many of the member participants had expressed their interest to 
participate in future voluntary or regulatory cap and trade markets, and also suggested that 
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the market should work transparently and legally controlled by federal agency (NY Times 
article author and year here)23.  
After the 1987 market crash, Brady (1988) submitted a report, “Report of the 
Presidential Task Force on the Market Mechanisms” to the US President. To control high 
volatility, the Brady report made several recommendations: (1) Margins24 should be made 
consistent to control speculation and financial leverage; (2) Circuit breaker mechanisms 
(such as price limits and coordinated trading halts) should be formulated and implemented 
to protect the market system; and, (3) Information systems should be established to 
monitor transactions and conditions in related markets. Based on the Brady report, several 
studies have proposed different mechanisms to control the high volatility of spot prices of 
financial stocks returns. The popular ones are increase the margin levels, set a price 
celling, and taxing of each transaction of the contract (France et al., 1994).  
Increased margin level: Margins are the minimum amount of cash that a buyer has 
to pay to the permit broker while the balance may be considered as loan borrowed from 
the broker against certain securities as collateral.  Brady report suggests a higher margin 
level to control the high volatility. The low margin levels lead to greater speculations, 
which further lead to higher volatility in returns (Moser, 1992). Other studies 
(Hardouvelis 1990, Moser 1992, France et al. 1994) observed a negative relationship 
between the margin level and volatility, and therefore, suggested a high margin level in 
order to reduce the volatility.  
                                                 
23 The New York Times ( January 3, 2011) http://www.nytimes.com/cwire/2011/01/03/03climatewire-
chicago-climate-exchange-closes-but-keeps-ey-78598.html 
 
24 In the financial literature, margin is considered as a collateral i.e., a party which holds the financial 
instrument will cover the risk of the opponent party.  
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Price celling or price limit: Brady report suggested that price limit would be one powerful 
mechanism to control the volatility of the returns. In this setup, the regulatory authority 
has power to control or limit the price basing on the previous day’s closing price. The 
regulatory authority can stop the trading if the opening price is below or over the previous 
day’s closing price and can wait until the price touches the limit. Price limit mechanism 
provides the authority to set the boundaries.  
Transaction taxes: According to France et al. (1994), transaction tax or taxing of the each 
contract can be considered as entry barrier condition. Their argument is that transaction 
cost excludes certain contracts which increase the volatility. Song and Zhang (2002) study 
observed that transaction tax discouraged the entry of short term traders and reduced the 
volatility. Further they argued that transaction tax would provide the revenue to 
regulatory authority.  
When it comes to the emission trading markets, price limit and transaction tax 
mechanism seem more suitable options. As we already have seen in the earlier section, 
CCX has experienced high fluctuations in the spot prices. The phase I prices were in 
range between $1 to 4 and phase II prices were in between 5 cents to $7.  Phase II 
program would have worked more efficiently if CCX had limited the lower bound prices 
and the quantity of the permits. The transaction cost mechanism would have stopped the 
short term or small offset providers in phase II as well. The policies on minimum margin 
and collateral requirements are worth considering if the market size grows substantially 
large and more cash-strapped buyers show up in the market. 
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2.6  Conclusion   
In this chapter I have analyzed the short-term spot price behavior of carbon 
dioxide emissions allowances of the United States’ first voluntary emissions trading 
market, Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX). I used the time series models, AR-GARCH 
and Markov switching models, to model the temporal aspects of extreme variations and 
then to relate that variation to known historical changes in regulatory and market 
conditions.   
First, I have estimated the volatility using GARCH (1,1) and observed a huge 
variation in conditional variances of the two phases, Phase I (2003-2007) and Phase II 
(2008-2010) of the US government. The literarture (Hamilton and Susmel, 1994; Susmel, 
1999) suggests that ARCH/GARCH models are not adequate to explain the behavior of 
the conditional variances and underlying structural changes. So, I have applied the 
Markov regime-switching model to identify the regimes. Markov model is considered an 
effective tool to estimate separate phases with different underlying stochastic processes. 
Based on Markov model, I have identified two regimes, pre-democratic (2004-2007) and 
democratic (2008-2010). Further, I have examined the tail behavior of these regimes to 
understand the reasons for high volatiliy. 
The  observed high volatiliy in the returns during the phase II of the CCX market 
explains the condition of the market. The spot prices fluctuated considerably throughout 
the first half of 2008, with a 67.5 percent volatility. During this time the price rose from 
$3.25 to $7.40 per ton of carbon, but collapsed to around $2 per ton in the next six 
months. The prices were dropped further in the later years and reached to 5 cents. I have
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identifed three possible regulatory and market reasons, which might have caused the high 
volatility and dramatic price drop in the phase II of the CCX market.  
The first cause was when Lieberman-Warner bill on climate change was approved 
by the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works in December 2007. Investors 
expected that United States would implement its first cap and trade program for 
Greenhouse Gas emissions. Consequently, they showed more interest in buying the 
carbon credits. But the situation changed when the bill was not approved by the Senate in 
June 2008; investors showed less interest in buying the credits. The second cause was 
when CCX issued more offsets during the period 2007-2008 to meet the demand. The 
spot prices might have dropped due to this excess supply of offsets. The third cause could 
have been Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), a mandatory emission reduction 
program of Northeastern states. The RGGI auctioned their first emission allowances in 
September 2008. We observed that a large number of CCX members were also part of 
RGGI and their participation in the auction might have reduced the demand for CCX 
credits.  
While the subject market has ceased to exist, new voluntary markets of carbon 
credits and offsets are emerging in the US and worldwide. Finance literature is replete 
with measures for controlling price volatility. For instance, margin rules, price control, 
moratorium on market transactions and financial taxes are some popular financial tools 
commonly applied in other asset markets. The CCX owners or the government did not 
resort to such financial measures, leading to a complete collapse of the market. A timely 
action taken at the first sign of market volatility in 2008 could have avoided the collapse. 
Therefore, the results of this study should provide an important insight for risk managers, 
investors and policy makers for improving the design of the voluntary emission markets.
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CHAPTER 3                                                                                      
AN APPLICATION OF EXTREME VALUE THEORY TO IDENTFY AND EXAMINE 
THE THRESHOLD LEVELS OF CCX AND EU ETS EMISSION TRADING 
MARKETS 
3.1 Introduction 
In the recent years, carbon permits have become an important asset for financial 
institutions and risk investors. The Commissioner of European Commission on Climate 
Change stated in a news article, “...by treating emission allowances as other financial 
assets, the proposal (classifying of spot carbon-dioxide contracts as financial instruments) 
extends financial market protectiswon to the carbon market. It will provide further 
certainty for carbon market participants as the market grows and matures” (Bloomberg, 
2011).  However, before formally accepting carbon permits as an asset, some of the 
financial institutions and risk investors25 have already played an important role in building 
and developing two major trading markets such as the Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX) 
and the European Union Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS). The CCX market, as 
elaborated in Chapter 2, was the first North-American voluntary and legally binding 
agreement. CCX market started in December 2003 and closed in December 2010; during 
this period a total of 700 million metric tons of carbon dioxide (CO2)equivalent were 
traded. EU ETS is a mandatory cap-and-trade program of the European Union, started in 
January 2005 and is in operation till now. EU ETS considers one of the largest emission 
trading markets, it covers 84 percent of the global trade volume with a total value of 
$119.8 billion in 2010 (Liancre et al., 2011).  
                                                 
25 For examples, banks such as Bank of America, financial service companies such as Access Industries and MB Investment, risk 
management institutions such as Managers’ International Association and The Professional Risk have participated in the 
Chicago Climate Exchange. 
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Under the EU ETS, the European Union (EU) countries agreed to impose CO2 
emission caps on 12,000 emitting facilities and distribute free allowances in amounts 
equal to their caps. The eligible facilities must report their annual current CO2 emission 
levels and give up one allowance for every ton of CO2 they emit (Ellerman and Joskov, 
2008). The EU sets a target for each member country as part of the National Allocation 
Plans (NAP). EU ETS operated in two phases. In Phase I (2005-2007), a total of 2.2 
billion allowances per year were released. In Phase II (2008-2012), these allowances were 
down to 2.08 billion per year. The allowances released in Phase I should be consumed in 
the same period and cannot carry forward to the next phase. The surplus and deficit of 
these European Union Allowances (EUA) can be traded at an authorized trading 
platforms such as Nord Pool, European Energy Exchange (EEX), European Climate 
Exchange (ECX), SendeCO2 and Powernext (now Bluenext).  
EU ETS is slowly gaining attention from market intermediaries, such as risk 
managers, brokers and traders. These agents trade on behalf of their clients and help to 
own stocks of EUAs (Sanin and Volante, 2009). When financial investors, risk 
management consultants, brokers, or traders participate in a trading market and hold any 
financial assets, they are keen on understanding the price dynamics, especially the 
frequency and magnitude of sudden drops or rises in prices. Such fluctuations have 
implications for estimating traditional risk measures like Value at Risk (VaR) and 
Expected Shortfall (ES) in the investment portfolio analysis. VaR is a probability tool to 
measure any financial or market based risks. It estimates the worst loss over a target level 
and provides a single value for a given confidence interval (Jorion, 1996). Expected loss 
is also used as a risk measure and often referred to as  conditional VaR or expected tail 
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loss.  The major difference between VaR and ES is the way they address the question, 
VaR asks the question, “how bad can things get?” whereas ES asks, “if things do get bad, 
what will be the expected loss?” (Hull,2012).  Such measures not only help investors but 
also policy makers.  Based on these risk measures, environmental regulator might want to 
implement a temporary moratorium on the permit market in order to prevent it from 
further financial collapse. 
Several studies considered CO2 allowances as a financial asset and have examined 
their price dynamics (Bunn and Fezzi, 2007; Rickels et al., 2007; Mansanet-Bataller et 
al., 2007; Alberola et al., 2008, Milunovich and Joyeux, 2007; Paolella and Taschini, 
2008; Benz and Trück, 2008; Chesney and Taschini, 2008; Seifert et al., 2008). These 
studies reveal that EU ETS responds to political, administrative, climate and other 
economic factors.  Bunn and Fezzi (2007) examine the relationship between the carbon 
emission prices and energy prices by using structural vector autoregressive model. They 
find that spot carbon prices are highly sensitive to the gas and electricity prices.  Seifert et 
al. (2008) note that the returns of EU ETS possess the martingale property26 and time 
dependent dynamic volatility; their study observed that as market approached a 
termination period there was a high volatility in prices. Their argument was that, due to  
the structure of EU ETS, which prohibits the transfer of permits from  Phase I to Phase II, 
the market forces the investors to sell the leftover permits at a lower price.  But CCX and 
EU ETS phase I have experienced high volatility in prices in different time frames. This 
chapter attempts to explain the reasons for extreme volatility behavior of the markets.     
                                                 
26 Martingale property is said to occur when the expected futures values of an asset do not depend on its 
historical prices (LeRoy, 1973).   
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Milunovich and Joyeux (2007) estimate a dynamic volatility model and suggest 
that none of the futures contracts follow a cost-of-carry relationship with the spot prices 
and finds that evidence for existence of arbitrage opportunities in the market for carbon 
permits. Benz and Trück (2008) observed different volatility behavior in Phase I due to 
policy and regulated changes such as the National Allocation Plan’s revisions and 
reductions in national emission caps. They also observed fat tails. Paolella and Taschini 
(2008) make similar observations and stress the need for applying more rigorous 
statistical models which concentrate on tail behavior. Both these studies are based on  EU 
ETS Phase I.  The third essay considers all three markets: CCX, EU ETS Phase I, and EU 
ETS Phase II. Our preliminary observations indicated that all three markets have had 
excess kurtosis, meaning the presence of fat tail distributions.     
The early studies of financial markets have taken two approaches to studying 
excess skewness and kurtosis in the permit prices. The first approach was to use non-
normal stable distributions instead of a normal distribution (Mandelbrot, 1963; Fama, 
1963). As an alternative approach to studying tail behavior, Engle (1982) developed the 
ARCH model.  Both these approaches focus on the entire distribution of returns, i.e., both 
tail and central parts of the distribution. DuMouchal (1983) argued that in order to capture 
the extreme volatility of financial returns, it was important to concentrate exclusively on 
the tail behavior. More recent studies in finance therefore suggest the use of extreme 
value theory (EVT) as a way to distinguish tails from the central part of the returns 
distribution.   
The primary objective of this study is to provide an accurate risk measure for EU 
ETS and CCX markets by applying  the EVT tool.  The key logical question that arises is 
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how frequently the fluctuations in the two carbon market prices exceeded their respective 
thresholds. While EU ETS is in its second phase and most probably will evolve into the 
third phase, CCX has totally collapsed. Therefore, an important question to ask is if the 
risk measures of extreme variations had changed over time in these two markets and if so, 
with what type of risk distributions. Further, in the cross-continental setting of these two 
markets, did the extreme variations behave in a similar manner? 
The study makes two significant contributions to the literature on emission permit 
markets. First, to my knowledge, this is the first ever application of the extreme value 
theoretic tool to studying the price dynamics of emission permit markets. Second, a cross-
continental investigation of emission market returns is very limited. This study sheds light 
on the extreme behavior of two different types of carbon markets: one that is mandatory 
and continues to grow robust (European Union Emission Trading System), and the other 
that was voluntary (Chicago Climate Exchange) and has ceased to exist.   
This essay analyzes the tail behavior of CCX and EU ETS markets to determine 
the relation between the market structure and the attitude of the investors. Furthermore, 
the chapter discusses the  policy and operational issues of these two markets, and suggests 
few policies, to make the market more attractive and gain attention of investors. The 
results of the study would be useful for regulated community, other investors, and the 
regulators. 
This essay is organized as follows. Section 3.2 explains the relevance and 
importance of the extreme value theory in modeling the risk and expected short fall of an 
asset.  Section 3.2 also discusses the different distributions of EVT. Section 3.3 discusses 
data and empirical results of the estimated models. Section 3.4 provides the comparative 
 111 
 
analysis of voluntary and mandatory markets. Section 3.5 gives the conclusion of the 
essay.  
3.2 Extreme value theory and extreme risk modeling 
Extreme value theory (EVT) is used for estimating the probability of events that 
have extreme fluctuations in their outcomes. Some common applications of EVT can be 
seen in forecasting extremes events of weather such as rains, floods, and hurricanes27. It is 
also very popular in modeling the risk losses of financial markets28. Financial literature 
demonstrates that EVT is a better approach to estimating VaR of heavy tail markets than 
the traditional methods.  
The tail behavior of financial markets have been widely discussed in the financial 
literature. Singh et al. (2012), Gilli and Kellezi (2006), Mancini and Trojani (2010), 
Onour (2010), McNeil et al. (2005), McNeil and Fray (2000) applied EVT to analyze tail 
behavior of different financial series. Singh et al. estimated the risk levels of the S&P-500 
index. Their studies suggest that application of EVT is quite useful in financial risk 
modeling. Mancini and Trojani estimated the VaR of S&P index using semi-parametric 
bootstrap method, which provided the extreme value estimator. Later they used the 
extreme value estimator to fit innovation tail distributions above some threshold levels. 
McNeil and Fray provided the dynamic extreme value theory, which was two stage 
extreme value process with GARCH (1,1) and allowed the investors to predict market 
                                                 
27 Applications of extreme value modeling have been used in weather and environmental forecasts (Pielke 
and Downton, 2000; Pielke and Landsea ,1998; Smith, 1989; Tarleton and Katz, 1995; Dawson 2000 etc.), 
thermodynamics of earthquakes (Lavenda and Cipollone, 2000), and wind engineering (Harris, 2001). 
 
28 Engineering, insurance and financial markets (McNeil and Frey, 2000; Gill and Kellzi, 2003; Embrechts, 
1999; Reiss and Thomas, 1997 etc.).   
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crash accurately. In this study, I followed the two stage model proposed by McNeil and 
Fray.  
 Broadly, there are two main methods to explain the extreme tail behavior and to 
forecast the risk (Singh et al. 2012): (i) generalized extreme value distribution or 
Distribution of maxima, which is further classified into three different distributions, 
namely, Frechet, Gumbel and Weibull distributions. (ii) generalized Pareto distribution or 
the peak over threshold approach.  Both methods are based on the maximum likelihood 
estimation (MLE).  What follows is a brief description of the two methods. 
3.2.1 The distribution of Maxima or Generalized Extreme Value Distribution (GEV) 
The GEV approach has been developed from the Fisher and Tippett’s (1928) and 
Gnedenko’s (1943) theorems (avilable in McNeil et al., 2005). Let us consider a series of 
random data points  with cumulative distribution function . The cumulative 
distribution of stochastic maximum  can be expressed as 
n
M xFxF n )]([)( = . As n increases to infinity, this cumulative distribution function (cdf) 
degenerates to 0 for all x where 1)( <xF  and to 1 for all x where 1)( =xF  The cdf of  
can be written as, 
  (3.1) 
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where 01 >+ ξ , ξ  is the shape parameter or tail index, μβ orn is the location parameter, 
and 0or >σαn  is the scale parameter. Based on the shape parameter, the extreme value 
distribution can take the form of Frechet distribution29 when 0>ξ , Gumbel distribution 
when 0=ξ , or   a Weibull distribution when 0<ξ .   
The GEV distribution has a major defect of losing data. To perform the analysis it 
takes only maximum losses in large blocks (MacNeil et al. 2005). In the appendix 2, I 
presented the figures of yearly maxima and minima of CCX, EU ETS phase  I  and phase 
II. There are seven large blocks for CCX, four for EU ETS phase I, and five blocks for 
EU ETS phase II.  It is very difficult to estimate EVT with small sample. To overcome 
this problem, Pickands (1975), and Balkema and de Hann (1974) proposed a new 
theorem, called Generalized Pareto Distribution, which uses all data points that are exceed 
a threshold level.   
3.2.2 The distribution of Generalized Pareto Distribution or Peak Over Threshold model 
The Generalized Pareto Distribution is applied to variables that have skewed, long 
tails.  The distribution function of GPD is defined in the following theorem (Picaands, 
1975; Balekema and de Haan, 1974)(available in McNeil et al., 2005): 
For a large class of underlying distributions F, the excess distribution function ܨ௨ can be 
approximated by GPD for an increasing threshold  ′ݑ′. 
ܨ௨ሺݕሻ ൎ ܩక,ఙሺݕሻ,							ݑ → ∞		 
and 
                                                 
29 Pareto, Cauchy, Student-t and mixture distributions are Frechet class of distributions; normal, exponential, 
gamma and lognormal distributions are Gumbel class of distributions (MacNeil et al. 2005). 
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ܩక,ఙሺݕሻ ൌ ൞1 െ ቀ1 ൅
క௬
ఙ ቁ
ିభ഍ , ߦ ് 0	
1 െ exp ቀെ ௬ఙቁ , ߦ ൌ 0
								     (3.3) 
Where y = x - u, x is the original random variable, ߪ is scale parameter and ߦ shape 
parameter, and also as ߪ ൐ 0, and ݕ	 ∈ ሾ0, 	ݔி െ ݑሿ when ߦ ൒ 0 and ݕ ∈ ቀ0,െߪ ߦൗ ቁ  when 
ߦ ൏ 0.  
Now, the crucial step is to identify a proper threshold level, u. As stated in Singh 
et al. (2012) and Liu (2011), the u should be high enough to ensure the POT distribution 
will converge. However, it should not be too high to ensure that enough observations are 
available to test the distribution. Mean excess plot is very popular to determine the 
threshold level (McNeil, 2005). Figures 3.8, 3.11 and 3.14 show threshold levels based on 
the mean excess plot. Now, we need to define the distribution of exceedance based on the 
observed threshold levels. 
Distribution of Exceedance:  
For a random variable ݔ with distribution function F, the conditional excess 
distribution function over a threshold ݑ is given by 
ܨ௨ሺݕሻ ൌ ܲሺݔ െ ݑ ൑ ݕ|ݔ ൐ ݑሻ ൌ ிሺ௬ା௨ሻିிሺ௨ሻଵିிሺ௨ሻ ൌ
ிሺ௫ሻିிሺ௨ሻ
ଵିிሺ௨ሻ 		   (3.4) 
Equation (3.4) gives the probability that the value of return exceeds the threshold by at 
least y. Now, with given distributions, and threshold levels, our task is to compute the 
VaR and ES. The expression in equation (3.4) can be explained from figure 3.1. The right 
panel gives the probability distribution of F(x), the dotted line represents the 
observartions below the threshold level. The thick line represents the observations above 
the threshold level. In the left panel, the F(x) is truncated to below the threshold level. 
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The truncated or conditional distribution function takes the values below the threshold 
level.   
 
                        
 
 
 
                     
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1. Distribution function F and conditional distribution function ܨ௨    
(Source: Gilli and Kellezi (2006)) 
 
3.2.3 Modeling the tails and measure of VaR and ES 
   Definition of Excess Losses. Let ܨ be the loss distribution with right endpoint 
ݔி and assume that for some high threshold ݑ, we have ܨ௨ሺݔሻ ൌ ܩక,ఙሺݔሻ	݂݋ݎ		0 ൑ ݔ ൑
ݔி െ ݑ and some ߦ ∈ Թ		ܽ݊݀	ߚ ൐ 0. By using this definition we can write the following 
expression, for ݔ ൒ ݑ (cite the original reference here), 
ܨതሺݔሻ ൌ ܲሺܺ ൐ ݑሻܲሺܺ ൐ ݔ|ݔ ൐ ݑሻ																																																										 
ൌ ܨതሺݑሻܲሺܺ െ ݑ ൐ ݔ െ ݑ|ܺ ൐ ݑሻ	
ൌ ܨതሺݑሻܨ	ഥ௨ሺݔ െ ݑሻ	
ൌ ܨതሺݑሻ ቀ1 ൅ ߦ ௫ି௨ఙ ቁ
ିଵ కൗ 				        (3.5) 
We will get the tail probabilities when we know ܨሺݑሻ. VaR then can be defined as the 
݌ݐ݄ quantile of the distribution ܨ.  
ܨ௨ 
0 ݑ ݔி 
ܨሺݔሻ 
1 
ݔ 0 ݑ ݔி െ ݑ 
ܨఈሺݕሻ
1
ݕ
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ܸܴܽఈ ൌ ܨିଵሺ1 െ ߙሻ 
ܸܴܽఈ ൌ ݍఈሺܨሻ ൌ ݑ ൅ ఙక ൬ቀ
ଵିఈ
ிതሺ௨ሻቁ
ିక െ 1൰		      (3.6) 
For ߦ ൏ 1 the Expected Shortfall is given by, 
ܧܵఈ ൌ ଵଵିఈ ׬ ݍ௫ሺܨሻ
ଵ
ఈ ݀ݔ ൌ
௏௔ோഀ
ଵିక ൅
ఙିక௨
ଵିక 		      (3.7) 
We can rewrite equation (3.4) by assuming that there are ݊ observations and that a total of 
௨ܰ observations are above ݑ. Replace ܨ௨ by the GPD and ሺ ௨ܰሻ ݊⁄ , which is the sample 
estimator of ܨതሺݑሻ.  Therefore,  expression,  
ܨ෠ሺݕሻ ൌ ேೠ௡ ቆ1 ൅
క෠
ఙෝ ሺݔ െ ݑሻቇ
ିଵ
క෠ൗ
       (3.8) 
and the corresponding VaR  and ES with  ݌௧௛	quantile can be written as 
ܸܽ෣ܴ௣ ൌ ݑ ൅ ఙෝక෠ ቆቀ
௡
ேೠ ݌ቁ
ିక෠ െ 1ቇ		       (3.9) 
ܧܵ௣ ൌ ௏௔ோ೛ଵିక෠ ൅
ఙෝିక෠௨ෝ
ଵିక෠ 			         (3.10) 
3.2.4 Dynamic extreme value approach 
The basic extreme value theory (EVT) assumes that errors are normally 
distributed with mean zero and a constant variance. But, most of the financial returns 
exhibit excess kurtosis or leptokurtosis and serial correlation. If we assume that the 
variable is stationary and unconditional, then the model would be viewed as a static EVT. 
Otherwise, would have to estimate dynamic EVT model by taking the conditional 
distribution of F and the volatility of returns (McNeil and Fray, 2005; Singh et al., 2011). 
As explained in the chapter 2, GARCH model is used to estimate the conditional variance 
of fat tail distributions.  In the first stage the volatility of the returns are estimated using 
 117 
 
the GARCH (1,1) model.  In the second stage, the residuals from the GARCH model are 
used to estimate the peak over threshold or Generalized Pareto Distribution to calculate 
the risk and expected shortfall.       
3.3 Data and empirical results 
To estimate the EVT model I used the daily closing spot price of CCX for the 
period from December 2003 - December 2010. A total of 1783 observations were 
obtained from the CCX web page. EU ETS spot prices were obtained from Bluenext30. 
For EU ETS, I considered two phases, Phase I (June, 2005 to February, 2008) and Phase 
II (March, 2008 – April, 2012).  Phase I consisted of 669 observations and phase II 
consisted of 1049 observations. Figures 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4 present the daily trading spot 
prices of CCX, EU ETS Phase I, and EU ETS Phase II emission markets, respectively.  
 
              Figure 3.2. Spot prices of CCX (December 2003 to December 2010) 
    
                                                 
30 http://www.bluenext.eu/ 
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                   Figure 3.3 Spot prices of EU ETS Phase I (June 2005 – February 2008) 
 
 
                   Figure 3.4. Spot prices of EU ETS Phase II (March 2008 to  March 2012) 
 
Before estimating the empirical model, daily closing spot prices were converted 
into log-returns in percentage terms, which can be expressed as 	ݔ௧ ൌ 100 ∗ ሺlogሺݖ௧ሻ െ
logሺݖ௧ିଵሻሻ. Table 3.1 provides the summary statistics of the data used in the analysis. As 
mentioned earlier, I estimated the dynamic EVT in two steps. First, the logreturn series 
using GARCH (1,1) model were estimated and used in obtaining the residuals. In the 
second stage I employed these residuals to estimate the EVT parameters. In estimating of 
the extreme value theoretic model, I used MATLAB code of Gilli and Kelezi (2006) and 
packages, extRemes, fExtremes and fgarch of R. Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) 
method was used to estimate the parameters of EVT. 
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            From the descriptive statistics (Table 3.1) it can be seen that all three data sets 
have significantly excess kurtosis when compared to the kurtosis of their normal 
distributions. This indicates that leptokurtosis and fat-tailed distributions are necessary to 
correctly describe the log-returns’ conditional distribution.    
Table 3.1. Summary statistics for log-returns of CCX and EU ETS 
Period CCX EU ETS EU ETS 
Full Sample Phase I Phase II 
N 1783 669 1048 
Mean -0.1658 -1.054 -0.1002 
Median 0 0 -0.018 
Max 27.19 51.08 20.38 
Min -63.25 -51.08 -10.81 
Std.dev 4.036 8.713 2.71 
Skewness -3.357 -0.311 0.127 
Kurtosis 54.686 11.71 7.48 
 
Negative skewness of CCX and EU ETS Phase I show that both markets are 
skewed left and suggest that the left tail is longer relative to the right tail i.e., more 
negative returns than the positive returns. Whereas, the positive skewness of EU ETS 
Phase II show more positive returns. From their respective means (Table 3.1), it can 
observed that all three markets experienced negative mean returns. The negative mean 
retuns might be the result of extreme events that have occurred in the markets.  
           From figures 3.5, 3.6 and 3.7 we can identify that CCX and EU ETS Phase 
I had high volatility before they were closed, during this time credits were sold at very 
low price. CCX reached its maximum trading price ($7/ton of carbon) during the month 
of June 2008, but the end of the same year the price dropped to $1.65 per ton of carbon. 
The prices were dropped to 5 cents per ton of carbon credit when it was closed in 2010.  
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                 Figure 3.5. Daily log-returns of the CCX (December 2003 to December 2010) 
 
 
                 Figure 3.6. Daily log-returns of the EU ETS –  I (June 2005 – February  2008) 
 
 
                
               Figure 3.7. Daily log-returns of the EU ETS – II (March 2008 – April 2012) 
 
 
In the case of EU ETS phase I, the trading was initially started with 23 euros per 
ton of carbon credit in June 2005. Phase I prices were quite stable until the market 
reached its maximum in April 2006. During the same month the market experienced a 
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sudden drop in the price from 24 euros to 15 euros, before dropping further all the way to 
6 euros at the end of the year. 
EU ETS phase II trading started in March 2008. So far it is the stable emission 
market. The spot prices are oscillating between 10 euros and 30 euros. In the beginning of 
the Phase II, the market experienced a high growth in prices. The market started with 20 
euros per carbon credit and within four months it reached to 30 euros per carbon. After 
June 2008, the spot prices experienced a steady drop. This may be due to excess supply of 
allowances, slow industrial productions and credit crunch crisis in the commodity markets 
(Chevallier 2010). In  following subsections 3.3.1, 3.3.2 and 3.3.3, I analyze the level of 
risk involved in these markets. To estimate the VaR and ES, I estimate the threshold 
levels using the mean excess plots. Figures 3.8, 3.11 and 3.14 show the threshold levels of 
the CCX, EU ETS Phase I and II, respectively. The computed threshold levels are 95% 
quantile of negative log-returns or left tail. The right panels in aforementioned figures are 
zoomed versions of the left panels. 
As explained in the section 3.2, I estimate the Generalized Pareto Distribution 
(GPD) to calculate the Value at Risk and Expected Shortfall. The log-likelihood function 
ܮሺߦ, ߪ|ݕሻ for the GPD can be written as, 
ܮሺߦ, ߪ|ݕ ൌ ቐ
െ݊ log ߪ െ ቀଵక ൅ 1ቁ∑ log ቀ1 ൅
క
ఙ ݕ௜ቁ 			݂݅		ߦ ് 0			௡௜ୀଵ
െ݊	݈݋݃	ߪ െ ଵఙ ∑ log ݕ௜ 																												݂݅		ߦ ് 0			௡௜ୀଵ
			 (3.11) 
 
3.3.1  Risk analysis of CCX  
Based on the mean excess plot, the threshold value of left tail (negative log-
returns) of CCX is estimated to be u = 5.82. A total of 86 observations (4.82 percent of 
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total observations) are above the threshold level. The threshold level of right tails is 
estimated to be u = 5.13 and a total of 85 observations (4.82 percent of total observations) 
exceeded this level. The shape parameter explains the rate of speed at which the tail 
disappears. The upward linear trend in the right panel suggests a positive shape parameter 
and refers that the estimated POT is heavy tailed (McNeil and Fray, 2005). 
 
Figure 3.8. Mean excess plot of loss series of the CCX market 
Note: the right panel provides the threshold level where the sample excess plot is linear. The upward linear trend suggests a positive 
shape parameter. The left panel provide closer view around the threshold level, Note: y-axis- mean excess, x-axis-threshold level 
Using equation (3.3.1), I compute shape parameter ߦ  and	scale	estimators	ߪ, for 
the sample exceeding the threshold level. Table 3.2 provides 95 percent confidence 
interval of estimated ߦ,	ߪ, VaR and ES for both tails. The left tails gives information of 
future loss of the corresponding market. The positive point estimation of shape parameter 
shows that the estimated POT model of the CCX market is heavy tailed. Both VaR and 
ES are estimated at 1% significance level. The left tail point estimation of VaR provides 
the loss percentage of tomorrow. CCX market faces a 15% risk if the market exceeds the 
negative log-returns of 5.82 (threshold level of left tail) and the corresponding expected 
loss percentage of tomorrow will be 25%. From investor’s point of view, holding of this 
particular asset is highly risky.  
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Table 3.2. Point and interval estimates of the POT model for both  the tails of the CCX 
market returns 
 Lower Bound Point Estimate Upper Bound 
 Left Tail 
ߦመ -0.1  0.355 0.647 
ߪො 4.320   5.683 7.534 
ܸܴܽ଴.଴ଵ 15.117  18.054 22.305 
ܧܵ଴.଴ଵ 24.929  33.588 75.888 
 Right Tail 
ߦመ 0.061  0.223 0.482 
ߪො 3.936  5.061 6.573 
ܸܴܽ଴.଴ଵ 12.613  14.775 17.735 
ܧܵ଴.଴ଵ 19.200  24.065 39.603 
 
I analyzed CCX market in chapter 2 and observed that CCX had high volatility in the 
second phase, i.e., January 2008 to December 2010. Maximum loss occurred during the 
period of June 2008- Aug 2009 and more than 50 percent of the permits were transacted 
between the participated members in this period. During the same period, a large number 
of offset permits were permitted by the CCX authority. A total of 53 million tons of 
offsets were released in between the years 2007 – 2008, whereas, for the Phase I, these 
offset were limited to 6 million (CCX, 2008; 2009; 2010). The excess supply of these 
offset permits might have caused the price drop and led to higher negative returns to the 
investors. As, described in the chapter 2, the other reason might be the political parties 
view on the environmental goals. Investors will not show any interest unless they are sure 
that the government policies are in strong support of the market for the carbon credits. 
 124 
 
In order to support the results in Table 3.2, I computed parameters ߦ,	ߪ and the 
corresponding VaR estimates on 1000 bootstrap samples and plotted in figure 3.9. The 
right panel provides 95% confidence interval for estimated parameters and the left panel 
provide 95% confidence interval for risk. Both panels support the above presented values 
Figure 3.10 gives the sum of loss returns by the month for the period December 2003 and 
December 2010.                     
 
Figure 3.9. Point and Joint 95% confidence intervals for ߦ,ߪ and VaR for the POT method 
of CCX market 
Note: ML are Maximum Likelihood estimates; BCa are Bootstrap bias-Corrected and Accelerated estimates; individual dots represent 
bootstrap estimates (1,000 in number).  
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Figure 3.10. Total loss/gain by month for the period the Dec 2003 – Dec 2010 of  
CCX 
 
3.3.2 Risk analysis of EU ETS Phase I 
Figure 3.11 shows the threshold level of EU ETS Phase I; the threshold level of 
left tail is u = 15.42.  A total of 33 observations (4.73 percent) exceed the threshold.  For 
right tail the threshold level is u = 10.54 and a total 32 observation (4.73 percent) exceed 
the threshold. Table 3.3 provides the corresponding shape and scale parameter. The shape 
parameter is negative indicating that the tail falls at a rate of 12%. VaR is computed at 1% 
significance level and predicts that tomorrow’s loss will be 30% more compared to 
previous day if negative log-returns exceed the threshold level. The corresponding ES 
will be 38% more than the previous day. 
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     Figure 3.11. Mean excess plot of loss series of the EU ETS phase I 
     Note: the right panel provides the threshold level where the sample excess plot is linear, the left panel provide closer view      
       around the threshold level, Note: y-axis- mean excess, x-axis-threshold level 
 
Similar to the CCX market, Phase I of EU ETS market also had high volatility in 
returns. When we look at the kurtosis of the Phase I, we see that the market is 
leptokurtosis and fat-tailed. The market is negatively skewed, which means that more 
periods of left tail than right tail. Unlike CCX, EU ETS is a mandatory program and is 
controlled by a strict regulatory authority governed by the European Union. However, due 
to organizational problems, these carbon markets may have been rendered unstable. In 
Phase I (2005-2007), a total of 2.2 billion allowances per year were released under the EU 
emission allowances scheme and these allowances should consume in the same period.  
Seitfert et al. (2008)  and Chavilier et al. (2010) argue that these allowances are more than 
required. Further, Seifert et al. (2008) argued that restriction on permits transfers forced 
the investors to sell at lower price when the market was close to termination period.  
Chavallier et al., (2010) observed that timing of the announcement of allowances also had 
a strong influence on the trading market. The investors in the market must have 
conjectured some drastic changes when these announcements were made. As the above 
authors noted, the rumors of “over allocation” might have created a big confusion among 
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the investors, leading to the market price drop in the month of April, 2006. These market 
phenomenon can be seen in  figure 3.13. 
 Table 3.3. Point and interval estimates of the POT model for both the tails of the EU ETS    
phase I returns 
 Lower Bound Point Estimate Upper Bound 
 Left Tail 
ߦመ -0.123  -0.123 0.264 
ߪො 0.001  10.732 8.167 
ܸܴܽ଴.଴ଵ 26.568  30.958 36.914 
ܧܵ଴.଴ଵ 33.164  38.821 56.827 
 Right Tail 
ߦመ 0.004  0.004 0.410 
ߪො 7.055  9.805 14.181 
ܸܴܽ଴.଴ଵ 28.012 31.023 39.234 
ܧܵ଴.଴ଵ 35.212 37.091 42.123 
  
In order to test the results in Table 3.3, I computed parameters, ߦ,	ߪ and the 
corresponding VaR estimates on 1000 bootstrap samples and plotted in figure 3.12.  
 
Figure 3.12. Point and Joint 95% confidence intervals for ߦ,ߪ and VaR for the peak over                 
threshold method of EU ETS Phase I market 
Note: ML are Maximum Likelihood estimates; BCa are Bootstrap bias-Corrected and Accelerated estimates; individual dots represent 
bootstrap estimates (1,000 in number).  
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The right panel in the figure 3.12, provides 95% confidence interval for estimated 
parameters and the left panel provide 95% confidence interval for risk. Both panels 
support the above presented values. Figure 3.13 provides the total gain or loss of each 
month. 
 
Figure 3.13. Total loss / gain by month for the period the June 2005 – April 2008 
of  EU ETS phase I.  
 
3.3.3 Risk analysis of EU ETS phase II 
EU ETS Phase II started on February 2008 and is still in operation.  So far, it is the 
most stable market among all carbon emissions markets. From the table 3.1, we can 
observe that EU ETS Phase II has experienced a positive skewness, which indicates more 
positive returns. Although the mean return is negative, it showed an improvement from 
the previous Phase. As observerd in other two markets, EU ETS also has high kurtosis in 
returns and exhibits high taildness. As explained in the above sections, the estimated 
threshold levels based mean excess plot are given as  = 4.811 with 52 observations (4.9 
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percent of observations) for left tail and ݑ =  3.99 with 52 observations (5 percent of total 
observations) for right tail. Figure 3.14 provides the estimated mean excess plot. The 
corresponding scale and shape parameter are provided in the table 3.4. The linear 
downward trend suggest a negative shape parameter.  
 
      Figure 3.14. Mean excess plot of loss series of the EU ETS phase II 
      Note: the right panel provides the threshold level where the sample excess plot is linear, the left panel provide closer view      
        around the threshold level, Note: y-axis- mean excess, x-axis-threshold level 
  
Table 3.4. Point and interval estimates of the POT model for both the tails of the EU ETS 
phase II returns 
 Lower Bound Point Estimate Upper Bound 
 Left Tail 
ߦመ -0.196  -0.196 0.314 
ߪො 0.001  2.135 2.752 
ܸܴܽ଴.଴ଵ 7.073  7.744 8.526 
ܧܵ଴.଴ଵ 8.274  9.048 11.019 
 Right Tail 
ߦመ -0.100  0.298 0.671 
ߪො 0.913  1.279 1.817 
ܸܴܽ଴.଴ଵ 5.836  6.589 7.789 
ܧܵ଴.଴ଵ 7.651  9.521 11.927 
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The market had few jolts in between 2008 and 2009 due to financial crisis 
throughout Europe, post-Kyoto negotiations and Copenhagen summit (Chavallier, 2010). 
The market was stable until June 2011, thereafter the permit price went down and large 
number permits traded. This type of phenomenon was observed by Seifert et al. (2008) 
for EU ETS phase I. They suggested that investors sell all the leftover permits at  the 
ending of the trading period. Chavillier (2010) observed that the allocated allowance of 
the Phase II period were less than Phase I, but can be still considered as larger than the 
required permits. After all these problems, investors and traders showed more interest in 
participating in the market. When we look at the VaR of both phases, the risk from Phase 
II market is much less than that of Phase I. The computed VaR is 7% and the 
corresponding shortfall is 9%. The bootstrap samples are plotted in figure 3.15 and the 
monthly loss/gain for EU ETS II is plotted in the figure 3.16.  
 
 
 Figure 3.15. Point and Joint 95% confidence intervals for ߦ,ߪ and VaR for the peak over                 
threshold method of EU ETS Phase II market 
Note: ML are Maximum Likelihood estimates; BCa are Bootstrap bias-Corrected and Accelerated estimates; individual dots represent 
bootstrap estimates (1,000 in number).  
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Figure 3.16. Total loss / gain by month for the period the Feb 2008 – Mar 2012 of 
EU   ETS Phase II.  
       
 
3.4 Comparative study of the CCX and EU ETS markets 
Both markets have experienced certain regulatory and operational issues, such as 
over allocation of the permits through higher caps or allowing third-party offsets.  For the 
purpose of comparison, I divided CCX market into two periods, pre-democratic 
(December 2003 – December 2007) and democratic (January 2008 – December 2010). 
Table 3.5 presents the descriptive statistics as well as the computed VaR and ES. 
Looking at the table, we can say that all these markets have fat tails and also it can be 
seen that about five percent of the observations exceeded the threshold levels in all the 
markets. Based on the threshold levels, shape and scale parameters, VaR and ES were 
estimated. The predicted tomorrow’s loss at 1% significance level were 9%, 28%, 31%, 
and 7% for CCX pre-democratic period (December 2003 – December 2007), democratic 
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period (January 2008 – December 2010) , EU ETS Phase I (June 2005 – April 2008) and 
Phase II (April 2008 – December 2012), respectively. 
Table 3.5. Point estimation of the POT model of the CCX, EU ETS phase I and  II returns 
  CCX pre 
democratic 
CCX 
democratic 
EU ETS 
Phase I 
EU ETS 
Phase II 
N 1020 763 669 1048 
Mean 0.0701 -0.4782 -1.054 -0.1002 
Skewness -0.241 -3.23 -0.311 0.127 
Kurtosis 14.512 39.996 11.71 7.48 
Threshold 
level 
4.763 9.53 15.42 4.81 
Nu 50 34 33 52 
%  of 
exceedence 
5 4.5 5 5 
ߦመ 0.349 0.16 -0.123 -0.196 
ߪො 2.16 10.68 10.73 2.14 
ࢂࢇࡾ૙.૙૚ 9.34 28.28 30.96 7.74 
ࡱࡿ૙.૙૚ 15.11 44.72 38.82 9.05 
 
The corresponding ES was 15%, 44%, 38%, and 9% for CCX pre-democratic 
period, democratic period, EU ETS Phase I and Phase II, respectively. The VaR and ES 
results of these markets indicate an operational problem.  CCX market was developed 
based on the United States sulfur dioxide emission trading program. The pre-democratic 
period was quiet stable and experienced a positive mean return. Investors were interested 
in assets that gave positive returns. As mentioned earlier, during this period 6 million 
offsets were released to meet the demand. Whereas, in the democratic period, more 
offsets were released than the demand. First phase of CCX was more stable and less 
volatile than the later period. It was also seen that holding an asset from democratic 
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period was 19% more risky compared to the pre-democratic period. The risk level 
increased because of the excess supply of permits in the market. In the second phase of 
CCX, prices dropped drastically, this situation might have happened as a result of the 
regulatory board decision, which allowed more offsets in the market than required.  
Similar to CCX market, in EU ETS allotted permit allowances were more than 
those required. EU ETS, Phase I was more volatile than Phase II. The yearly allowances 
allotted in Phase I were 120 million more than Phase II. The Phase I was in operation for 
three years and a total of 6.6 billion allowances were released; the total number of 
allowances were 360 million more than Phase II. Moreover, these allowances were not 
transferable to` Phase II. The restriction on inter-phase banking probably made  investors 
desparate to sell the leftover allowances for any positive price when the market 
approached the termination period. In Phase II, the number of allowances was reduced 
and restricted to 2.08 billon per annum, and an auction of 10% of the allowances was 
allowed (Hepburn et al., 2006). These new developments in the EU ETS market 
minimized the risk loss to the investors. The computed expected loss (ES0.01) from Phase 
II (9.05) is 29 percent points less of Phase I (38.82). Further, EU ETS has proposed the 
auctioning of permits in phase III and allow more industries into the permit trade. 
3.5 Conclusion 
This essay attempted to analyze the tail behavior of three well-known emission 
trading markets, Chicago Climate Exchange, European Union Emission Trading Scheme 
Phase I and Phase II by using the extreme value theory. The financial risk literature has 
long recognized that estimating the Value at Risk and Expected Shortfall by traditional 
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methods such as GARCH or ARCH will give narrow results and that these methods are 
not adequate when the markets are having high volatility, excess kurtosis and skewness. 
The method of dynamic EVT is a powerful tool; it examines the tail behaviors of the 
observations which are above certain threshold level. 
The estimated results from dynamic extreme value theory model suggested that 
both CCX and EU ETS have similar sort of problems in relation to the operational and 
policy issues. Phase I of CCX was more matured than the later phase. Phase I was 
designed based on the US’s successful sulfur dioxide emission trading program. The CCX 
authorities allowed fewer offset providers and encouraged trading between the existing 
members. Whereas in phase II of CCX, the market authorities overestimated the demand 
for credits and allowed more offset providers. The excess supply of the permits had a 
huge impact on the price; it ultimately led the price to 5 cents per permit.  
Similar problems had occurred in the EU ETS program. The authorities of EU 
ETS created 2.2 million per year allowances in phase I of EU ETS program which were 
more than the required.  The program also had required the permits to be sold in the same 
period i.e. inter-phase banking/ trading was not allowed. Because of the restriction, 
traders have sold the saved permits at a lower price when the phase I reached to the 
termination period. The EU ETS authorities were allowed 1.9 million allowances; a small 
reduction in the allowances compared to previous phase and proposed further reduction in 
the later period. The authorities allowed auctioning of fewer excess permits in phase II 
and extended the auction feature in the next phase. Based on the estimated results, we 
observed that these changes made in the phase II reduced the risk of holding the carbon 
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asset.   Our study also observes that political ambiguity on the climate and cap and trade 
programs have great impact on the emission prices. 
In conclusion, I believe that climate change negotiations at international and 
national level have greater impact on permit trading markets. Proper measures of spot 
price dynamics and related risk measures are essential for investors, risk managers and 
public agencies to help gauge the carbon market performance.  As illustrated in this study, 
early warnings of excessive market reactions to regulatory, technological and economic 
changes can be easily developed by way of accurate risk measures. Such measures could 
motivate appropriate preventive and reaction policies in order to avoid or at least 
minimize the losses associated with severe market collapses.   
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APPENDIX 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
           Figure 3.17.Yearly maximum and minimum log-returns of CCX 
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              Figure 3.18.Yearly maximum and minimum log-returns of EU ETS -I 
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        Figure 3.19.Yearly maximum and minimum log-returns of EU ETS -II 
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